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Recent Decisions
CASPARY v. LOUISIANA LAND A EXPLORATION CO.-THE
COMMON LAW RIGHT TO INSPECT CORPORATE
RECORDS FOR PROPER PURPOSE
In Caspagy v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.,' a divided United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that, under
Maryland law, a shareholder of a Maryland corporation does not have a
common law right to inspect the corporate stock ledger "for proper purpose." The majority held that to inspect the corporate stock ledger, a
stockholder must comply with the statutory requirements of the Maryland General Corporation Law, section 2-513,2 which calls for ownership of at least five percent of the outstanding stock of any class for at
least six months. This interpretation makes the Maryland statute the
most restrictive statute governing inspection of corporate books in any
jurisdiction.' If followed by the Maryland courts, the decision will create additional barriers to effective proxy fights by insurgent shareholders
of large Maryland corporations.4
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Maryland's corporate law as the court believed that the Maryland courts would,5 did
not follow established rules of statutory construction. The precedential
value of the decision should be weak, because the reasoning was unpersuasive and the extent of the holding was unclear. The court expressly
reserved for the future the question of shareholders' right to inspect corporate records in cases of fraud or looting of corporate assets by directors. This Note will stress, therefore, that the Maryland courts should
not follow Caspag. The serious implications of the decision may also call
for the legislature to clarify Maryland law.
I.

THE FACTS

Delo H. Caspary was a citizen of Texas and a shareholder in the
1. Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1983), aj'g 560
F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1983).
2. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-513 (1975).
3. See infra note 126.
4. See b'fta notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
5. Federal jurisdiction in Caspary was based on diversity of the parties, see infra note 11.
As a result the Erie doctrine was invoked, which required the Caspaiy court to interpret Maryland law as the court believed the Maryland courts would. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938).
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Louisiana Land and Exploration Company (LL&E), a Maryland corporation.6 He had invested approximately three million dollars in the
company, but owned only .3% of the outstanding shares of LL&E. 7 The
company performed well for many years, but in 1981 its performance
began to deteriorate.' Dissatisfied with the company's results, Caspary
organized the Louisiana Land Committee for New Management. 9 The
Committee began a proxy solicitation to elect new management at the
next annual meeting, scheduled for May 12, 1983. To this end, on April
4, 1983, Caspary requested permission to inspect the current shareholder
list, which the company refused. °
Caspary instituted a diversity suit" in federal district court 12 to
force LL&E to release the stock ledger. Management asserted that section 2-513 abrogated the common law and imposed requirements (five
percent holding) which Caspary did not satisfy. Caspary's position, on
the other hand, was that the statutory provisions were supplemental to,
not in substitution of, the common law right to inspect for proper purpose."3 Summarily dismissing Caspary's suit, the district court held that
the statute abrogated the common law. 4 On appeal, the circuit court
affirmed the decision of the district court.' 5
6. Caspaiy, 560 F. Supp. at 856.
7. Caspary owned 117,100 shares of LL&E stock, i., which constituted .3% of the 37.98
million shares outstanding, 2 MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 3962 (1983). The average
price per share was $26. MOODY'S HANDBOOK OF COMMON STOCKS (Winter 1983-84).
8. "Current management's performance in recent years hasn't given investors much to
cheer about, either."

39 THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY, PART III: RATINGS AND

12, at 1834 (Dec. 16, 1983). Earnings per share rose from 1968 to 1980, but fell
from $4.74 in 1980, to $3.82 in 1981, to $2.01 in 1982. Id. In the end of 1982, LL&E's staff
prepared the company's financial forecast for 1983. These figures, which were shown to
LL&E's board of directors, predicted that the company's 1983 earnings would decline to
$1.60 per share. Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., No. 83 Civ. 4065, slip op. at
2, 3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1983), affTd, No. 83-7687, slip. op. at 850 (2d Cir. Jan. 5, 1984) (per
curiam). This prediction failed to materialize. LL&E's first-quarter earnings unexpectedly
rebounded to $.70 per share, or double the earnings for the first quarter of 1982. For the first
three quarters of 1982, the earnings per share rose to $2.03. These returns were 45% higher
than for the same period of 1982, but still fell far short of the earnings for the first three
REPORTS

quarters of 1980 ($3.48) and 1981 ($3.34). 39 THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY, PART
III: RATINGS AND REPORTS 12, at 1834 (Dec. 16, 1983).

9. Caspaty, 560 F. Supp. at 856.
10. Id.
11. The action was based on diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). Caspary was
a resident of Texas, while LL&E was incorporated in Maryland and had its principal place of
business in Louisiana.
12. Caspaq,, 560 F. Supp. at 855.
13. Caspa,, 707 F.2d at 786.
14. Caspary, 560 F. Supp. at 857.
15. Caspary, 707 F.2d at 794. Subsequent developments deserve mention. Caspary finally
obtained access to the stock ledger, basing his claim on New York law. Michael Robbins, a
LL&E shareholder, filed suit in New York. Robbins v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.,
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THE CASPARY DECISION

A.

Background

At common law, a shareholder in a Maryland corporation could,
irrespective of the extent of his holdings, inspect corporate records upon
showing proper purpose.' 6 In 1868, the Maryland General Assembly
granted all shareholders the right to inspect corporate records.' That
broad statute contained no restrictions on the right to access. When
revising the Maryland General Corporation Law' in 1908, the General
Assembly repealed the 1868 statute and gave the right of inspection to
shareholders holding five percent of capital stock. The 1908 statute required the corporation to make the shareholder list available to all five
percent shareholders at the company's principal office in the State dur-

No. 9333/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 1983). The corporation refused to allow him to inspect
its ledger, claiming that he was Caspary's agent, and therefore, was precluded from filing the
suit by res judicata. LL&E also claimed that it did not do business in New York, and thus,
was not subject to New York law. The corporation maintains an office in New York City,
which is used for contacts with shareholders and securities analysts. This office is not used for
the management of any corporate business activities, although meetings of the Board of Directors of LL&E have been held in the office. In addition, the corporation owns, but does not
operate, a 50% interest in a New York leasehold. Id. at 4. The court interpreted "doing
business" broadly and concluded that the company does do business in New York. The court
also rejected the company's other argument and concluded that Robbins had his own interest, apart from that of Caspary, in inspecting the stock ledger. However, Caspary gained
access to the ledger rather late in the game-the court order was issued on April 27, and the
stockholder meeting was held only 15 days later. Caspary lost the proxy contest under unclear circumstances. Moody's Industrial News Reports reported:
The preliminary count of the inspector of election indicated that a majority of
shares voted had initially been voted in favor of the Committee's [Caspary's] nominees, but that a sufficient number of those proxies had apparently [sic] been revoked
to result in the incumbent board apparently receiving a majority of the votes.
Moody's Industrial News Reports, June 3, 1983, at 3962. A representative of the Office of
Shareholder Relations of LL&E represented in a phone conversation that this news story was
untrue. In any event, Caspary filed suit in federal court in New York, alleging that "the
Company's proxy solicitations contained material misrepresentations and ommissions in vio" Caspary v. Louisiana
lation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ....
Land & Exploration Co., No. 83-7687, slip op. at 847 (2d Cir. Jan. 5, 1984) (per curiam).
Caspary sought an injunction invalidating the result of the election and requiring resolicitation of proxies. He lost in the trial court, Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., No.
83 Civ. 4065 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1983), appealed, and finally lost on appeal, Caspag, No. 837687 (2d Cir. Jan. 5, 1984) (per curiam). This ended the Caspary saga.
16. Parish v. Maryland and Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 88, 242 A.2d 512, 547
(1968). While there are no Maryland cases directly on point, the Maryland Constitution
guarantees the common law of England (as it existed on July 4, 1776) to the inhabitants of
Maryland, MD. CONST. art. 5. The right of inspection is part of the common law of England.
See Dominus Rex. v. The Fraternity of Hostmen in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 25 Str. 1233, 93
Eng. Rep. 144 (K.B. 1745), cited n Caspaty 707 F.2d at 794 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 5, 67 (1868) (repealed 1908).
18. 1908 Md. Laws 43-45, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 73 (1911).
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ing regular business hours.1 9 Refusal to exhibit the list was a misdemeanor punishable by a penalty of $50 (payable to the shareholder) for
every such refusal.2 ° In 1916, the legislature eliminated the penalty and
criminal offense provisions of the 1908 statute.2 1 The modern version,
section 2-513 of the Maryland General Corporation Law,2 2 was adopted
in 1951.23 The 1951 inspection statute added the six month holding
requirement and granted corporations twenty days in which to make
the shareholder list available. Although the various statutes have been
interpreted in several cases, 24 the Maryland courts have never consid19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 1916 Md. Laws 1207.
22. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-513 (1975).

23. 1951 Md. Laws 304.
24. In Weinhenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 A. 245 (1898), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland stated that the unqualified right of inspection granted by the 1868 statute would
be denied if a corporation alleged and proved that a shareholder tried to inspect the records
"for some evil, improper or unlawful purpose." Id.at 333, 42 A. at 248. The court based this
dictum on its discretionary power to deny mandamus if granting the petition would be inequitable. Id.at 332, 42 A. at 247. The dictum, in reality, changed the substantive law, because
in subsequent decisions the absolute right given by the 1868 statute became illusory and
unenforceable.
Wight v. Heublein, 1l Md. 649, 75 A. 507 (1910), reinforced the decision in
We:ihhenmaytr. The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not allow the Heublein brothers to
inspect the corporate records, despite the fact that they owned more than the statutorilyrequired five percent of stock outstanding. Refusing to grant mandamus, the court held that
the brothers' purpose was alleged to be unlawful, and if the allegation were proven the writ
should be denied. Id. at 657, 75 A. at 509. The court also cited with approval cases from
other jurisdictions which emphasized the common law right: Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S.
148 (1905); Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 56 N.E. 1033 (1900);
Sellers v. Phoenix Iron Co., 105 Pa. St. 175, 30 A. 822 (1895). Wight, 111 Md. at 658, 75 A. at
510. While the issue in CaspaO, was not addressed, the approval of the Wghi court seems to
indicate that court's belief in the continued existence of the common law, even after the
passage of the 1908 statute.
In a more modern case, American Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, No. 87,012, slip op. at
13 (Sup. Ct. of Baltimore City, July 29, 1964) (Barnes, J.), the issue of inspection rights was
considered. The petitioners owned more than five percent of the stock of the Maryland Casualty Company. American General wanted to inspect the stockholder list of Maryland Casualty Company to offer those stockholders an exchange of stock. But American General's offer
did not comply with the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. Id at 6, 15. The defendants alleged 45 deficiences in the American General Life Insurance Company Registration
Statement. They further alleged that the preliminary registration statement was misleading
and did not comply with § 5 and § 10 of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at 6. The petitioners admitted all factual allegations. Id.at 3.
Judge Barnes held that noncompliance with the Act constituted improper purpose of
inspection. Id.at 10, 15. Following Wght, he denied the petitioners the right of inspection,
despite the fact that American General met the statutory requirements of five percent ownership. Id.at 9.
In a subsequent case, Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24,
242 A.2d 512 (1968), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a member of a non-stock
association had a common law right to inspect the association's records for proper purpose.
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ered whether the Maryland inspection statutes abrogate the common
law right of inspection for a proper purpose. Caspaov thus presented a
novel issue of Maryland law: Is the statutory right of inspection a substitute for, or supplemental to, the common law right.
B.

Holding

Affirming the district court's holding that section 2-513 comprehensively covered the entire field of right of inspection and left no room for
the common law, 25 the circuit court offered three lines of reasoning. It
reasoned that the 1868 statute abrogated the common law, and that its
subsequent repeal in 1908 could not revive the common law, absent a
specific legislative intent to revive.2 6 Further, the court concluded that
the intent of the 1908 statute was to abrogate the common law. 27 Finally, it agreed with the district court that the statute covered the entire
field. 2' The extent of the court's holding in this case is unclear, because
the majority expressly left open the question of access to the stock ledger
in cases in which a shareholder "could demonstrate looting of corporate
assets by the incumbent directors, or other serious malfeasance. "29
Judge Winter dissented, arguing that the common law was not abrogated by the 1868 statute.30 The dissent also argued that the common
law and the statute were not in conflict, and therefore, the Maryland
courts would presume the vitality of the common law. 3 ' Finally, the
dissent concluded that since Caspary's purpose was proper, he should
32
have been allowed to inspect the corporation's ledger.
Id.at 88, 242 A.2d at 547. Parish, a member of a non-stock association, filed a derivative suit
against the directors for fraud. Id. at 39-41, 242 A.2d at 520-21. He indicated no intent to
inspect the association's records. In fact, for tactical reasons, he argued that he could not
inspect the association's records, because he could not secure the cooperation of five percent of
the membership. (The attorney for the plaintiff in Panh, H.M. Brune, argued that the plaintiff could not obtain cooperation of five percent of the membership, and therefore, could not
inspect the records. Mr. Brune, likely, did not want to delay and complicate the proceedings
by introducing new issues, especially considering that inspection could not have benefitted his
clients in any way. Appellants Brief and Record Abstract at 34, Panrh.) The defendant association also argued that Mr. Parish could not inspect the association records because he could
not secure the cooperation of five percent of the membership. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on the other hand, held that the statutory provisions of the inspection statute did not
apply to membership associations and that under either the common law or the 1868 Act, the
plaintiff had a right to inspect the records. Pansh, 250 Md. at 91, 242 A.2d at 549.
25. Caspag, 560 F. Supp. at 857.
26. Caspaiy, 707 F.2d at 791-92 & n.15.
27. Id. at 792.
28. Id. at 791.
29. Id. at 793.
30. Id.at 796 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id.at 795-96.
32. Id. at 799.
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III.

ANALYSIS

Whether section 2-513 abrogates the common law is a question of
legislative intent. The Maryland legislature can completely abrogate a
common law rule, either expressly or impliedly" Because neither the
current statute nor its predecessors expressly refer either to the existence
of the common law or to the exclusivity of the statutory right, the common law is abrogated impliedly, if at all. The question is essentially one
of statutory construction, and the established rule of statutory construction requires the Maryland courts to interpret a statute in order to effectuate its legislative intent.3 4 In determining legislative intent, the courts
must first consider the statutory language.3 5 If, as in Caspao,, the statutory language is ambiguous, the court should venture outside the four
corners of the statute and consider extrinsic evidence,36 including the
statutory purpose, its policy, and legislative history.3 7
Extrinsic evidence of the legislative intent can be naturally divided
into three categories: pre-enactment, contemporaneous, and post-enactment. Because the Maryland legislature does not publish the minutes of
floor debates, committee reports, or on-the-floor amendments, there is
virtually no contemporaneous evidence of the legislature's intent. Preenactment evidence consists primarily of prior statutes or common law.
Analysis of similarities and differences between the old and new laws is
crucial to understanding the purpose of the legislature in changing the
law.3" Consideration of the old law is also important in ascertaining the
intent of the new statute. In this situation, it is necessary to distinguish
between repeal and amendment of the prior statute. For purposes of
determining the intent of the new statute, a repealed statute is treated as
if it never existed.3 9 The new statute does not acquire the intent of the
prior law. On the other hand, if the prior statute is amended (i.e., some
clauses of the statute are reenacted in substantially the same terms),
then the clauses that are carried forward are presumed to be intended

33. In re Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 102, 299 A.2d 856, 859 (1973).
34. Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 389, 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982).
35. Harbor Island Marina, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Calvert County, 286 Md.
303, 311, 407 A.2d 738, 742 (1979).
36. Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 558, 121 A.2d 816, 823 (1956).
37. State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 435 A.2d 764 (1981).
38. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 558, 121 A.2d at 823.
39. Unless the repealed statute is reenacted in substantially the same terms, it has the

same effect as if it never existed. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes 384 (1974); IA J. SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.33 (D. Sands ed. 1972).

A reference to a

repealed statute can help to determine the true intent and purpose of a succeeding statute,
but if the terms are substantially different, then the new statute gets its own interpretation.
Johns v. Hodges, 33 Md. 515, 524 (1871).
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for the same purpose as the old statute.4"
Post-enactment evidence consists of subsequent amendments and
rejections of proposed amendments to the statute. This type of evidence
may constitute legislative interpretations of the statute and thus may
shed some light on its purpose. However, later legislatures are likely to
act under a different set of circumstances than did the original legislature. Thus, the intent of a later legislature is not necessarily indicative
of the intent of the original statute. The general rule is that subsequent
enactments "cast no light on the [original] legislative intent."4 1
If, after evaluation of all the available evidence, the legislative intent to abrogate is evident, or if the ascertainable legislative purpose can
not be effectuated without abrogating the common law, the courts
should conclude that the statute substitutes for the common law.42 The
courts also can conclude that the common law is substituted by the statute if the statute occupies the entire field. On the other hand, if such
intent or purpose are not ascertainable, or if the statute does not clearly
occupy the entire field, the Maryland courts should presume the vitality
of the common law rule.
A.

The Maj'ority Opinion

The majority presented three lines of reasoning, none of which followed the established rules of statutory construction. The majority also
misinterpreted the authorities, citing cases which did not support its position, quoting out of context, and relying extensively on judicial and
legislative inactions. Before a statute can be interpreted, a question
must be resolved: which statute should be construed? The majority
never resolved that question but instead construed each in their first,
second and third lines of reasoning, respectively. First, the majority held
that the 1868 statute abrogated the common law on the subject,43 and
that the subsequent repeal of the 1868 statute did not revive the common law.44 It argued that such revival is not possible without a manifest
legislative intent, and the absence of such a manifestation indicates the
intent to abrogate.4 5
The court's conclusion is incorrect. It is generally accepted that
40. Amended provisions of the original act or section which are repeated in the body of
the reenactment, either in the same or equivalent words are considered to be a continuation
of the original law. IA J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, § 22.33.
41. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 360, at 787 (1953).
42. See 25 R.C.L. 1054, eited with approvalin Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356
(1934).
43. Caspaty, 707 F.2d at 791-92.
44. Id. at 792 n. 15.
45. Id.
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when a statute abrogating a principle of the common law is repealed,
the common law is revived.4 6 While it is true that legislative supremacy
requires the courts to adhere to legislative intent, in the absence of ascertainable legislative intent to abrogate the common law, the courts resolve the question by presuming the common law to be revived. The
Maryland legislature did not indicate any intent to abrogate when it
repealed the 1868 statute. Therefore, analysis of the 1868 statute alone
was not sufficient to determine whether the common law was abrogated.
One decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland supports this
47
reasoning. In Parish v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Associalzon,
the Court inquired into the intent and purpose of the 1908 statute,
rather than into the statute then in force. 48 The approach, of the Parish
court, to examine the 1908 statute, would have been appropriate for
Caspag. If the common law right did not exist in 1908, it clearly does
not exist now.49 On the other hand, if the 1908 statute was not intended
to abrogate the common law, all subsequent amendments have been too
5
minor and too technical5 ° to deny the right to the common law. ' In
addition, the general rules of statutory construction require the court to
inquire into the intent of the 1908 statute, 52 because the five percent
holding provision was reenacted without changes.
The Caspaty court did not ignore the 1908 statute, and in its second
line of reasoning, the court concluded that the intent of the 1908 statute
was to abrogate the common law. Construing the statute, the court misinterpreted the effects of pre- and post-enactment legislative history, judicial analyses, and commentaries on Maryland corporate law. A
comparison of the 1908 statute with the 1868 statute shows that the primary purpose in enacting the former statute was to curtail the abuse of
the unqualified statutory right to inspect corporate records of the latter
statute. There is no other contemporaneous evidence of legislative intent beyond this, since the Maryland General Assembly does not publish
46. Id. at 795-96 (Winter, C.J., dissenting); see also Neal v. State, 45 Md. App. 549, 413
A.2d 1386 (1980); 73 Am. JUR. 2D Statutes 384 (1974); 15A C.J.S. Common Law 121 (1967); 2A
J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01, at 268 (D. Sands ed.
1974).
47. 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968).
48. Id. at 89, 242 A.2d at 548.
49. Subject to the court's ability to create common law.
50. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
51. MD. CONST. art. 5, guarantees the common law of England (as it existed on July 4,
1776) to the inhabitants of Maryland. The Maryland courts have established a presumption
of preservation of common law absent some substantial legislative enactment, Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 464, 475 (1859), cited with approval in Gray v. State, 43 Md. App. 238. 242, 403
A.2d 853, 856 (1979); see also Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934).
52. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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any committee reports, floor debates, or any other evidence of legislative
intent. As noted above, the legislative intent of the 1868 statute is irrelevant, because the legislature's intent in 1868 can not affect the rights of
the parties once the 1868 statute has been repealed.5 3
Turning to post-enactment legislative history, the court contended
that the common law right to inspect corporate records does not exist in
Maryland, because the Maryland General Assembly in 1951 did not
fully adopt the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation
Act (MBCA).5 4 The Assembly did not adopt section 52 of the MBCA,5 5
which granted the statutory right of inspection to a five percent or six
month shareholder in addition to the codified common law right. If the
legislature had considered section 52 of the MBCA and rejected it, then
the court's argument might be persuasive. But there is no indication
that the Maryland General Assembly ever considered the language of
section 52 of the MBCA. While Fletcher, in his Cyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporatons,56 indicates that the Model Business Corporation Act
was used generally in the drafting of the Maryland General Corporation
Law, there is no evidence that specific language of the Act was considered when section 2-513 was drafted. Moreover, the rejection of the language of the Model Business Corporation Act in 1951 does not help to
ascertain the intent of the 1908 statute.5 7
The court's analysis of the Parish decision 58 is also questionable.
Relying on a dictum in Parsh,5 9 the court argued that the 1908 statute
abrogated the common law because the 1908 statute was designed to cut
"abuse of the common law right" of inspection.' As the Caspary dissent
pointed out, the conclusion that the common law was abrogated is unlikely.6 1 The 1868 statute, which granted shareholders the unqualified
right to inspect corporate records, presented shareholders with a practically unqualified potential for abuse, a much broader potential than
that presented by the common law. Hence, it is reasonable to assume
that the 1908 law was intended to correct the 1868 statute, not the common law. "Parish, even as dictum, can not sensibly be understood to sug-

53. See supra note 39.
54. Caspagy, 707 F.2d at 789 n.7.
55. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 52 (1979); see also infra note 126.
56. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2.2 (rev.
perm. ed. 1983).
57. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 179-83
(1975).
58. Caspay, 707 F.2d at 787-88.
59. Id at 788.
60. Id (quoting Parish, 250 Md. at 90, 242 A.2d at 549).
61. Id.at 799 n.15 (Winter CJ., dissenting).
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gest a legislative intention to abolish the common law right."'62
In Parish,the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statutory
provisions of section 2-513 did not apply to membership associations,
and that members of associations have the common law right of inspection for proper purpose.6 3 The Caspagy court interpreted this holding to
mean that the court did not believe that the statutory right in section 2513 was supplementary to the common law right of inspection. 6' It reasoned that, if the court had believed so, "it would not have unnecessarily
labored to rule that a member of a membership corporation is not to be
equated or analogized to a stockholder."6 Actually, by deciding the
case the way it did, the court avoided the issue presented in Caspaiy.
The court found that section 2-513 did not apply to membership associations,6 and therefore, the court did not consider the issue of
whether the statutory right to inspect is exclusive. Because the issue in
Caspaty was never addressed by the Parish court, any inferences drawn
from the court's silence lack persuasive force.
Finally, the court analyzed several commentators on Maryland
law. Quoting the treatise of the well-respected Maryland authority, Arthur Machen,6 7 the court claimed that "Machen forthrightly acknowledges that the answer in each particular case must depend on the scope
of the statute."'
However, the court ignored the remainder of
Machen's sentence which continues, "but the tendency is to regard the
statutory rights as supplementary to the common law rights, rather than
as substitutions for them." 69
The majority also claimed that Fletcher's Cyc/opedia of the Law of
Private Corporationssupported the court's position.7" Fletcher did note the
general trend toward limiting "the right to proper purposes which are
62. Id. On the one hand, the majority argues that the 1868 statute abolished the common
law forever, id.at 792, and on the other hand, it claims that the purpose of the 1908 statute
was to prevent the abuse of the common law right, id.at 787.
63. Parish,250 Md. at 90, 242 A.2d at 549. The Panshcourt expressly left open the question whether the right of inspection was the common law right or the statutory right under
the 1868 act. "We do not decide whether his common law right of inspection or his statutory
right of inspection under. . . the Acts of 1868 continued.
... Id.at 91, 242 A.2d at 549.
However, the 1868 statute was repealed in 1908, 1908 Md. Laws 43-45, and it is assumed that
the 1868 statute never existed, IA J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, § 23.33. Therefore, the
right of inspection must be based on common law.
64. Caspary, 707 F.2d at 788.
65. Id (citations omitted).
66. Parish,250 Md. at 87-88, 242 A.2d at 547.
67. 2 A. MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1908).
68. Caspary, 707 F.2d at 790.
69. A. MACHEN, supra note 67, § 1109.
70. Caspaty, 707 F.2d at 790 (citing 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2215.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1976)).
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reasonably related to the interests of the shareholder. ' 71 But Fletcher's
comments refer only to types of proper purpose; he does not mention
any statutory restrictions based on either extent or period of shareholder
holdings. The court, implying that Fletcher's limited observations on
restriction on proper purpose also applied to ownership restrictions, concluded that the five percent restriction of the 1908 statute was encompassed by the trend to limit shareholders' rights.
The court also quoted France, in Prnciples of Corporation Law,7 2 as
stating:
Prior to the revision of 1908, it was the right of any stockholder
to demand a personal inspection of the books at any reasonable time . . . . The present law limits this right to any person or persons holding in the aggregate five percent of the
capital stock, or of any class thereof if two or more classes have
been issued. 7"
It concluded that France "no doubt" believed that the common law was
abrogated. This conclusion is not supported by France's text. The
above quote constitutes part of a long statement which lists three rights
conferred upon minority shareholders by statutes.74 The opinion failed
to mention footnote 4, which immediately follows the quoted sentence:
"In Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, the right of inspection is declared to
be a common law right;. . .. "" It is clear, when one reviews France's
statements, that he is discussing only Maryland statutory law-not common law. The only comment on common law is footnote 4, in which he
points out that a common law right of inspection existed. However, this
common law right did not necessarily exist in Maryland, since there
were no cases on point at that time. It is hard to imagine that France
would fail to mention his belief in the exclusivity of the statutory right
in Maryland if he possessed such definite convictions as the majority
ascribed to him.
Finally, the majority noted 76 but misinterpreted H.M. Brune's position in his book, Maryland Corporation Law and Practice.77 In the first edition of his book, Brune strongly indicates his belief in the existence of
the common law right of inspection: "The statutory right [of inspec-

71. 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 70.
72. J. FRANCE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW (1914).
73. Id. § 58, at 101, quoted i Caspag, 707 F.2d at 791 n.10.
74. Id. at 100-01.
75. Id. at 101 n.4.
76. Caspagy, 707 F.2d at 790 n.9.
77. H. BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (rev. ed. 1953), cited in
Caspag, 707 F.2d at 790 nn.9-10.
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tion], however, is doubtless supplemental to the common law right of reasonable access to by-laws, minute books and stockholders' lists."" 8
Twenty years later, in the second edition, 9 the language is different:
"The statutory right, however, is possibly supplemental to the common
law... ,and may not supersede such right altogether."8 " In a footnote,
Brune clearly explains his position:
The further restriction of the statutory right under the 1951
revision would permit a persuasive argument to a court of equity to
grant an applicationby a substantialstockholderfor leave to examine the
books, although he had not held his stockfor a sufftient periodor could
not otherwise qualiy under the statute. The Court of Appeals has
stated that, fundamentally, the right to inspect the books rests
on the proposition that those in charge of the corporation are,
in substance, merely the agents of the stockholders who are the
real owners of the property . . . . The basic relationship of the
stockholder to his corporation is not altered by the statutes, and it may
well be that these statutes are intended to grant additional and supplementagy rights of inpection, in aid of the basic general rikht.8 '
It is impossible to accept the majority interpretation that this remark is
aimed only at the six month holding requirement.8 " First, if Brune had
meant to apply this sentence only to that requirement, the phrase
"could not otherwise qualify under the statute" could have only one
meaning. Since the statute has only two express conditions, i.e., six
month and five percent holding, that phrase could only refer to the five
percent holding requirement. Evidently, the words "substantial stockholder" in the quote imply someone in the position of Caspary, who
owns less than the required five percent, but who still invested enough
money in the corporation to make his interest in corporate affairs more
than mere curiosity. Second, it is difficult to accept an interpretation of
section 2-513 which would allow waiver of the six month holding period
requirement, but not the five percent requirement.
In conclusion, there is no legislative evidence on the intent of the
1908 statute. Parish, the only relevant case, does not provide a clear
guideline. Scholarly commentators on Maryland corporate law are not
in accord with one another, but they generally seem to support the Casparr dissent.8 3 While out-of-state cases have no precedential value, they
78. H. BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW 181 (1933).
79. H. BRUNE, supra note 77.
80. Id. § 383, at 445 (emphasis added), quoted inCaspaWy, 707 F.2d at 790 n.9.
81. Id. at 445 n.26, quoted in Caspaty, 707 F.2d at 790 n.9; id.at 797 (Winter, C.J.,
dissenting).
82. Caspay, 707 F.2d at 790 n.9.
83. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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almost without exception support the dissent.84 The majority failed to
demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the legislature intended to abrogate the common law. In this situation, the Maryland law presumes the vitality of the common law.8 5 The majority's
second line of reason thus fails to support the conclusion that the common law right of inspection did not survive the 1908 statute.
The majority offered one more line of reasoning, no more persuasive than the first two. Both the Caspagy appellate majority 86 and the
district court" argued that the inspection statute fully occupied the entire field of shareholder inspection rights. But neither the district nor
the appellate court explained how they defined the entire field of a statute.8 8 Regardless of the definition used by either court, it is unlikely

84. See Caspa7y, 707 F.2d at 798 and cases cited therein. Of the three out-of-state cases
cited by the majority, Neiman v. Templeton, Kenly & Co., 294 Ill. App. 45, 13 N.E.2d 290
(1938); Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 Ill. 279, 52 N.E.2d 769 (1944); Daurelle v. Traders Fed.
& Loan Ass'n, 143 W. Va. 674, 104 S.E.2d 320 (1958), the last tends to support the court's
position. The other two do not. In Neiman, the Appellate Court of Illinois construed the
Illinois statute which was virtually identical to MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 52 (1979).
The court decided that the common law "saving clause" did not relate to shareholders, but
only to the subject matter of inspection, and that a shareholder who owned less than five
percent of stock for less than six months was not entitled to inspect corporate records even if
he could prove a proper purpose. See Neiman, 294 I11. App. at 51, 13 N.E.2d at 192. This
interpretation is rather unique, and it was promptly overruled by the legislature. 1941 I11.
Laws 421, 426. When an amendment is enacted soon after a legal controversy regarding
statutory interpretation-here, three years later-the statute as amended usually is regarded
as the legislative interpretation of the original act. IA J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, § 22.30,
at 784. In Morris, the Supreme Court of Illinois construed the same statute as amended in
1941 to mean that the statutory limitation (six months or five percent) applied only if a
shareholder tries to collect penalties. Morri , 385 Ill. at 234-35, 52 N.E.2d at 792. The link
between the holdings in the latter two cases and the situation in Caspagy is tenuous. The
majority in Caspary often quotes out of context, and ignores authorities contrary to its position. This creates an uneasy feeling that the court was not very attentive to the arguments of
the parties. Footnote 12 in Caspagy, 707 F.2d at 791, does indicate a lack of seriousness on the
part of the court.
85. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
86. Caspary, 707 F.2d at 791.
87. Caspay, 560 F. Supp. at 857.
88. While the courts often use the term, see cases cited in 15A C.J.S. Common Law § 12, at
55 n.79 (1967), they generally do not specify their definition for "the entire field" or "the
whole subject matter." Compare Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959 (Wyo. 1973) (bankruptcy
statute covers the entire field and common law is abrogated), with Lee v. Hilman, 74 Wash.
408, 133 P. 583 (1913) (a similar statute did not abrogate common law). Sutherland suggests
that the statute totally supersedes and replaces the common law if the statute prescribes
"minutely a course of conduct to be pursued and the parties and the things affected, and
specifically describ[es] limitations and exceptions." 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 46,
§ 50.05. In In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 461, 133 P.2d 492, 500 (1943), the court gave a
workable definition for the entire field, saying that the legislature intends a statute to cover
the entire field if an attempt was made to provide for every possible contingency.
It is reasonable to assume that a statute covers the entire field (and therefore abro-
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that section 2-513 occupies the entire field of rights of inspection, because the Maryland courts have in fact based their decisions regarding
inspection rights on the old common law, proper purpose grounds. For
example, in Parish, the Court of Appeals recognized the possible continuation of the common law right of inspection for members of an association.8 9 It is unlikely that a statute occupying the entire field of
inspection of corporate records could leave to common law the entire
subject of the right of inspection by members of an association. In addition, in Weinhenmayer v. Bziner,9 Wight v. Heublein,9 1 and American General
Life Insurance Co. v. Miller,92 the Maryland courts denied the right of inspection to shareholders who met the statutory requirements. In all
three cases, the courts based their denial on the common law requirement of proper purpose. These decisions indicate that Maryland courts
have not treated the statute as occupying the entire field, and that the
conclusion of the Caspagy court is at best tenuous.
In addition to using questionable reasoning to support its result, the
court hedged on the extent of its holding. By doing so, the court contradicted its position that the statutory right is the exclusive source of a
shareholder's right to inspect corporate records.
It may well be that a short duration stockholder with less than
five percent of the stock nevertheless might be held to have a
right to inspect stock books and other documents to which the
five percent and six months' requirements of Section 2-513 apply if he could demonstrate looting of the corporate assets by
the incumbent directors or other serious malfeasance.9 3
If the inspection statutes are the only source of a shareholder's right to
inspect the corporate ledger, it is difficult to see how the court derives
this exception to the statutory requirements.
The majority position is also illogical both in its recognition of some
common law rights and in the justification for that recognition. The
statute has no textual exceptions, and any judicial expansion must be
based on common law. In other words, in the opinion of the majority, a
common law right of inspection for proper purpose exists for some purposes, but not for others.9 4 In recognizing this limited common law
gates the common law) when the court never needs to resort to the old common law to resolve
a case which falls in the gap between statutes.
89. Parnsh, 250 Md. at 91, 242 A.2d at 549. See also supra note 63 for a discussion of the
Parish court's holding on the common law.
90. 88 Md. 325, 42 A. 245 (1898).
91. 111 Md. 649, 75 A. 507 (1910).
92. No. 87,012, slip op. at 13 (Sup. Ct. of Baltimore City, July 29, 1964) (Barnes, J.).
93. Caspao,, 707 F.2d at 793.
94. The court suggests that the right of inspection for fraud is independent of the abro-
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right, the court seems to draw the line between intentionally bad, and
incompetent, management. The distinction should be relevant only to
personal liabilities of directors, not to the ability of shareholders to
change corporate policies. The intentional-incompetent distinction simply does not reflect reality. After all, incompetent, but honest, managers
can destroy an investment as thoroughly as a corrupt manager can.
Furthermore, the court has created a "Catch-22" situation. A share95
holder "might be held to have a right to inspect" corporate records, if
he could demonstrate looting of corporate assets by directors, other serious malfeasance, or fraud. He, of course, would face the very difficult
task of proving the director's wrongful conduct without an opportunity
to examine the corporate records.
In sum, the majority's reasoning is not persuasive. Although the
judgment as to what constitutes sufficient evidence of legislative intent is
highly subjective, and the position of the majority is not groundless,96
the court's craftsmanship leaves much to be desired. It would have been
better if the majority had limited itself to citing the authorities which
support its stance and had not forced the sources onto the Procrustean
bed of its preconceptions.
B.

Alternative Support for the Holdng

A different line of reasoning may support the holding in Caspary. It
can be argued that the 1908 statute did not abrogate the common law,
but instead, restrictedthe common law. In other words, it can be argued
that the legislature intended to set a minimum requirement for inspection and that that limited right to inspection was still subject to the
common law requirement of proper purpose.
Legislative history and case law support this argument. The historical trend of the legislation is toward restricting the right of inspection:
the 1868 statute gave an unqualified right of inspection to all shareholders; the 1908 statute gave this right only to shareholders who owned
more than five percent of the outstanding stock; the 1911 amendment
removed the penalty provisions; and the 1951 amendment further limited the right of inspection by introducing the additional six month
holding requirement, and gave the corporation a twenty-day grace
gated common law right to general inspection. Finding no fraud, the court notes "[t]he continued existence of one common law right simply does not establish the existence of another."
Id The court does not, however, discuss how it derives the existence of this limited common
law right.
95. Id.
96. The diversity case, Rosengarten v. Buckley, Civ. No. HM-80-2935 (D. Md. Feb. 23,
1982), supports the majority position, if in dictum.
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period.97 A history of legislation that diminishes shareholders' statutory
right of inspection is (at least) not inconsistent with a legislative intent to
restrict the common law right of inspection.
Analysis of Maryland cases on the subject does not diminish the
98
plausibility of this proposed statutory interpretation. In Weinhenmayer,
Wight,9 9 and American General,"° the Maryland courts did not allow
shareholders who satisfied the statutory requirements to inspect corporate records because the shareholders did not have a proper purpose for
inspection. The statutory language of section 2-513 does not contain a
proper purpose restriction. If the statute is interpreted to grant a statutory right of inspection to any shareholder who satisfies the statutory
requirements, the courts in these cases arguably subverted the express
statutory language. The principle of legislative supremacy allows such
judicial interference only if it is based on the court's recognition of the
legislative intent or purpose.' 0 ' In none of these cases did the court base
the holding on recognition of legislative intent. Arguably these decisions
rest on the assumption that the statutory right of inspection is not exclusive; the proposed interpretation of the statute is more consistent with
these precedents than is the majority's approach.
Interpreting the 1908 statute to restrict the common law right does
not conflict with the holding in Parish.0 2 It can be argued plausibly
that in Parsh the court held that the 1908 statute was intended to impose minimum requirements for inspection on shareholders of stock corporations, but not on members of associations. While this position finds
no support among commentators, it is at least as plausible as the majority position, and (together with the dissenting opinion) deserves the serious attention of the Maryland courts.
C

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion of Judge Winter offered a generally persuasive analysis of the authorities.
The dissent concluded that Caspary had a proper purpose for inspection and should have been allowed access to LL&E's stock ledger.' 3
Judge Winter suggested that the case be remanded, and that the stockholder meeting be postponed until after the case had been finally adju97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 24.
See id.
See id.
See R. DICKERSON, supra note 57, at 201, 205.
See Parish,250 Md. at 90, 242 A.2d at 548.
Caspaiy, 707 F.2d at 795-96 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
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dicated on remand. The Judge also recommended that if Caspary
prevailed, the meeting should be further postponed until his rights had
0 4
been vindicated. 1
While the dissent correctly pointed out the major analytical and
logical inaccuracies of the majority, Judge Winter did not respond fully
to all the majority's lines of reasoning. In addition, the major argument
of the dissent requires clarification. The Maryland courts should accept
the analysis of the authorities provided by the dissent, but should concentrate on streamlining the dissent's reasoning.
The dissenting opinion indicates the flaws in the majority's analysis, but does not effectively counter the majority's conclusion that the
1908 statute was intended to abrogate the common law. Following the
error of the majority, the dissent never indicated which statute must be
interpreted: the 1868 statute, the 1908 statute, or section 2-513. Nevertheless, Judge Winter rebuffed the first line of the majority's arguments,
correctly concluding that the repeal of the 1868 statute revived the common law right of inspection for proper purpose. 0 5 But the dissent sidestepped the analysis of the intent of the 1908 statute. Admitting the
possibility of an implied repeal of common law, 10 6 Judge Winter nonetheless concluded that since the common law and section 2-513 are not
in express conflict, the statute did not abrogate the common law.'0 7
This argument is insufficient, since the absence of express conflict does
not preclude an implied abrogation. The dissent should have inquired
into whether the legislature intended to abrogate the common law; only
if such intent is not ascertainable should the common law be presumed
to survive. 108
To counter the third line of the majority's reasoning, the dissent
argued that section 2-513 did not occupy the entire field.' 0 9 The dissent's approach to the question, however, was drastically different from
the majority's. The majority interpreted the entire field narrowly, concluding that section 2-513 occupied the entire field of rights of inspection. 1 0 But the dissent interpreted the entire field broadly, arguing that
the Maryland General Corporation Law did not displace the common
law of corporations in its entirety."' Thus, Judge Winter's arguments
do not negate the majority's conclusions. The dissent should have ex104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.at 795.
Id at 796.
See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
Caspary, 707 F.2d at 796-97 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).
Id at 791-92.
Id at 796-97.
Id at 800-01.
Id. at 799-800.
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plained either why the majority interpretation of the entire field is incorrect, or why the majority's conclusion, that section 2-513 occupied the
entire field of rights of inspection, is incorrect. Despite these shortcomings, the dissenting opinion is generally persuasive and deserves the careful consideration of the Maryland courts.

IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASPARY DECISION

Plausible arguments support both the majority and the dissenting
positions; the opinions are based on opposing interpretations of legislative intent and history, and on differing views of other authorities.
Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, inquired into the implications of Caspay.
Proxy contests are an important instrument of corporate control.12
Although insurgent shareholders more often than not lose proxy contests, the threat of being voted out of office serves as a check on managerial behavior. The more the law protects incumbent management, the
less effective proxy contests are as a deterrent, and the less sensitive management will be to shareholder concerns.'
Management has important advantages over insurgent shareholders in a proxy fight. First, management can pay the substantial expenses
of a pit y solicitation from the corporate coffers, and can dedicate facilities and personnel of the organization to carry out the contest.'" 4 The
insurgents, on the other hand, must pay their own way, with uncertain
chances of being reimbursed in the future." 5 In addition, corporate
management can cast the votes of shares that the corporation holds as a
trustee." 16 Finally, and most importantly, management has easy and
unlimited access to the shareholder list.
The crucial element of an effective proxy contest for the insurgent is
early access to the current stock ledger. Even if entitled to the ledger by
law, the insurgent stockholder can expect substantial resistance on the
part of management." 7 To gain access to the ledger, the insurgent can
18
rely on the Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rule 14a-7,"

112. See E.
ed. 1968).

ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL

3

(2d

113. Note, Protecting the Shareholders' Right to Inspect the Share Register in Corporate Proxy Contests
for the Election of Directors, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1273, 1275 (1977).
114. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 112, at 9.
115. Id at 400; see also Note, The Corporate Fiduciay's Power to Vote its Own Stock, 68 COLUM.
L. REV. 116 (1968).
116. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 112, at 569-81.
117. Note, supra note 113, at 1274.

118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1983).
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state voting list statutes,' '9 and the state right of inspection of corporate
records. 12' Rule 14a-7 is largely ineffective; management is given an
option either to make available a copy of the stock ledger or to mail the
proxy solicitation materials for the insurgent. Understandably, management almost invariably chooses the latter alternative.' 2 ' That allows
management to obtain the insurgent's proxy solicitation material early
(and thus to prepare its reply) and to control the timing of the mailing.
Even if management chooses the former alternative and provides the
shareholder list to the insurgent, rule 14a-7 does not require manage22
ment to specify the number of shares owned by each shareholder.
Clearly, the insurgent would like to concentrate his limited resources on
23
the largest shareholders.
The decision in Caspaty is extremely important in this context. Because Maryland does not have a voting list statute, the right of inspection of corporate records is the only effective recourse for the
shareholders of Maryland corporations. Delo Caspary was not allowed
an inspection which would have been allowed in any other jurisdiction.124 If the Maryland courts follow this decision, shareholders of
Maryland corporations will have to rely exclusively on a statutory right
of inspection 25 which is more restricted than rights granted under any
other state inspection statute.126 Shareholders may thus be thwarted
119. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 215 (1983).
120. For an excellent discussion, see Note, supra note 113.
121. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 112, at 38; Note, supra note 113, at 1295.

122. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 112, at 39.
123. Id; Note, supra note 113, at 1296.
124. See anfla note 126.
125. But see infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
126. The Model Business Corporation Act allows a person who has been a shareholder of
record for at least six months or who is the holder of at least five percent of all the outstanding
shares of the corporation to inspect the corporation's records, including the stock ledger.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 52, $ 2 (1979). The Act supplements the statutory six months
or five percent right by recognizing the common law right of inspection upon proof by a
shareholder of proper purpose. Id
4.
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted various versions of the
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 52 (1979): ALA. CODE § 10-2A-79 (1980); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 10.05.240, 10.05.246 (1968); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-052 (1977); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1600 (West Supp. 1983) (five percent ownership, or one percent ownership and filing schedule 14B with the SEC give absolute right of inspection, or stockholder must show a purpose
reasonably related to his interest as a shareholder); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-5-117 (Supp. 1982)
(three months, or five percent, or proper purpose); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-345 (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.157 (West 1977) (one quarter of one percent ownership and six months
holding period, or five percent, or proper purpose); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-122 (Supp. 1982);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-52 (1983); BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 45, 1933 I11. Laws 308,330;
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.47 (West
Supp. 1983-84); Ky. REV. STAT. § 271A.260 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:103 (West
1969) (two percent and six months, or twenty five percent and six months for a business

1984]

CASPARY V. LOUISIANA LAND

when trying to oust incumbent management.
Although the impact of the Caspary decision on shareholders of
Maryland corporations that confine their business activity to Maryland
is evident, the effect of the Caspagy decision on shareholders' ability to
obtain the corporate records of a Maryland corporation that does substantial business in other states is far from clear. The general choice of
laws rule requires the courts to apply the law of the state of incorporation when the internal affairs of a corporation are in question.' 27 But
shareholders' rights of inspection are not considered to be internal affairs.' 2 8 Thus, in right of inspection cases the courts often apply the law
of the forum state.' 29 This seems to be a prevailing rule where the corporate books are also kept in that state.' 30 Moreover, in at least two cases,
the law of the forum state was applied when the books were kept in a
third state.' 3 1 The Restatement of Confict of Laws goes even further and
competitor, or proper purpose); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 626 (1969) (ten percent, or
six months, or proper purpose); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972) (six months, or one percent, or proper purpose); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-513 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2050
(1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.105 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:52 (Supp. 1983);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-28 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-50 (1983); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 624 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38 (Supp. 1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19-51 (Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.260 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAws § 71.1-46 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-260 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 47-4-24 to -28 (Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-717 to -728 (1979); TEx. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.14 (Vernon 1980); VA. CODE § 13.1-47 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23A.08.500 (Supp. 1983-84); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-105 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.43 (West 1957 & Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-144 (1977 & Supp. 1983). Twelve
states have statutes basically declarative of common law: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-334
(West Supp. 1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-2-14
(Burns 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6510 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 32
(West 1970); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.148 (1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.37
(Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.71 (West 1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,

§ 1308 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-47 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 1896 (1973). Hawaii, Minnesota and Missouri grant an apparently absolute right to
inspect a corporate stock ledger: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-51 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.461 (West Supp. 1983) (Minnesota also requires a corporation to produce a free copy
of the stock ledger to a shareholder, if he has a proper purpose to inspect it); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.215 (Vernon Supp. 1983). The law of Arkansas allows inspection for a proper purpose
to a shareholder of record for at least six months. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-312 (1980).
Caspary had a proper purpose, and thus would have been granted the right to inspect
in all jurisdictions, except perhaps Arkansas. He would also have been allowed to inspect in
Arkansas, provided he had owned some stock for at least six months. Maryland is the only
jurisdiction where the corporation could have prevailed.
127.

17 W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8326

(1977).
128. 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations§ 416 (1968).
129. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.3D 869 (1968).
130. Id. at 874 n.9.
131. See Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 250 Minn. 265, 84 N.W.2d 919 (1957);
Beryl v. United States Smelting Refining & Mining Co., 34 Misc. 2d 382, 228 N.Y.S.2d 394
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suggests that the law of the venue should be applied no matter where
32
the books are kept, including, apparently, the state of incorporation.
In addition, at least one state, New York, has a statute which allows
resident shareholders to inspect, for proper purpose, records of foreign
corporations doing business in the state. 133
If shareholders of a Maryland corporation have a proper purpose
for inspection, but do not satisfy the statutory requirements of section 2513, they may engage in forum shopping to obtain the corporate ledger.
Their best chance at access to the corporate records is in the New York
courts. 1 34 If the corporation does not do business in New York or if the
shareholder group has no New York state residents, the shareholders
should file a mandamus petition in the state where the corporate books
are kept. Their situation is worse (but not hopeless) if the corporate
books are also kept in Maryland.135 Then, the shareholders should
136
search for the most sympathetic court.
The Caspaiy court failed to consider public policy issues. Two policy considerations-promotion of more responsible corporate management and prevention of forum shopping-call for reversal of Caspary
and should be considered by the Maryland courts in future proceedings.
The Caspary decision also deserves serious legislative attention. Corporations choose to incorporate in one state rather than in another for a
variety of reasons, most of which are non-economic. 3 7 Corporate managements understandably prefer to incorporate in states with pro-management corporate laws. By the same token, states have fiscal interests

(1962). But see State ex re/Grismer v. Merger Mines Corp., 3 Wash. 2d 417, 101 P.2d 308
(1940) (inspection was allowed, but the law of the state of incorporation was applied.).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304 comment d (1971).
133. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 103 (McKinney 1963).
134. See supra note 15.
135. Where a firm's "books" are kept in a computer data base and are accessible in multiple locations, the meaning of "location" of the books is ambiguous. Shareholders could argue
that the books are "kept" in any state where the records are accessible through a computer
terminal. Note also that the reservations of courts to apply the law of the forum state when
the books are kept in a third state are based basically on jurisdictional grounds. The courts
are reluctant to order a corporation which is incorporated outside of their jurisdiction to
perform positive acts outside the court's jurisdiction.
136. If a shareholder group is sufficiently large, theoretically, the shareholders can sue the
corporation in all states where the corporation does business. The principle of res judicata
does not pose any problem, since while any shareholder acts as an agent of the group, he has
his own personal interest in obtaining access to the corporate records. See supra note 15.
137. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 92 (1970). Henn lists 108
factors which a corporation should consider in choosing a jurisdiction in which to incorporate. Only a few of these can be considered to be economic reasons; for example, he lists
incorporation and franchise taxes and the expense of long-distance litigation.
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in attracting firms to incorporate: 38 in addition to state income taxes,
all states charge incorporation taxes and fees and more than a half of all
states charge annual franchise taxes. 139 These taxes are, in essence, a toll
on the privilege to be judged by the law of the state of incorporation.14 0
This competition for corporate revenue rewards those states with the
most permissive corporate laws. In this "race for the bottom," Delaware
has emerged as the clear winner,"' and in passing lax corporate laws,
the other states try to "out-Delaware Delaware" or, at least, their neighbors.' 42 Maryland's right of inspection, as interpreted in Caspary, outDelawared everyone.
Regardless of the reasons of the 1908 legislature in passing, and of
the 1951 legislature in retaining, the most restrictive inspection statute
on the books, conditions may be ripe for change today. First, Maryland
no longer has a financial incentive to maintain pro-management corporate laws. In 1972, Maryland abolished its franchise taxes and effectively dropped out of the "race for the bottom."'14 3 Second, the choice of
laws rules substantially diminish the effectiveness of section 2-513 as corporate protection against shareholder abuse and as a litigation prevention technique. Finally, the shareholders should be given reasonable
opportunities to inspect corporate records, because they, and not management, are the owners of corporations.
No special conditions exist in Maryland which would warrant a
right of inspection statute that is drastically more restrictive than the
laws in any other jurisdiction. The common law right of inspection for
proper purpose has served all those states well, and the courts have protected corporations from unduly curious shareholders.'44 The Maryland legislature should follow the example of sister states and explicitly
allow inspections for proper purpose.
138. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 861, 898 (1969).
139. ST. & Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H) 21 la, 222.
140. The directors of the corporation are in a fiduciary relation with the shareholders and
the corporation. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939), citedin Bovay v.
H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808 (Del. Super. 1944). The directors have a duty to deal with
corporate assets in the best interests of the shareholders and the corporation. Since a corporation has no economic reason to incorporate in any particular state, the directors seem to be
obligated to choose to incorporate in a state which does not impose franchise taxes.
141. Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisalof Santa Fe: Rule lob-5 and the New Federalism, 129
U. PA. L. REV., 263, 269 (1980); Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
142. Jennings, Federalization of CorporationLaw. Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991
(1976).
143. 1972 Md. Laws 792.
144. If anything, complaints have been heard on the behalf of shareholders, not of corporations. See Note, supra note 113.
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CONCLUSION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not
approach Caspag with the attention it deserves. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland should answer such an important question of law with a
well-reasoned, authoritative opinion. The real blame for the uncertainty, however, rests with the Maryland General Assembly, which
failed to be explicit regarding the common law rule. If the legislature
approves of the "proper purpose" rule, it should follow the example of
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia and adopt language
which explicitly declares the common law rule. If the Maryland General Assembly is in agreement with the majority in Caspar',,it should not
divest its political responsibility; it should state clearly the purpose and
policy of the law.

STATE v. COLLINS-LIMITING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY
In State v. Colh'ns' the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to allow a witness hypnotized prior to trial to testify as to matters recalled
under hypnosis.2 Changing the previous rule in Maryland,3 the court
held that such testimony will be admitted only when it is clearly demonstrated that the witness has made such statements prior to hypnosis.'
The Frye5 test, which adjudges evidence based on scientific procedures
admissible if considered reliable by the relevant scientific community,6
was adopted to evaluate this testimony.7 However, the court did not
define the general acceptance standard, leaving satisfaction of the Fge
test open for relitigation. The court also did not give guidelines for the
clear demonstration of pre-hypnotic statements, but little further litigation should be needed to develop such standards.
I.

FACTS

Appellee Collins was charged in the Circuit Court for Worcester
County with the first-degree murder of his wife.8 Davis, an eyewitness,
testified that he was standing a few feet away from Mrs. Collins' car
when she was shot.9 After this first trial, which ended in a hung jury,' °
Davis was hypnotized to enhance his recollection of events surrounding
1. 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
2. Id. at 703, 464 A.2d at 1045.
3. See Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 394, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048, cert. denied, 290 Md. 719
(1981) (applying the Frye test and sending case back to trial court to determine if test met; no
explicit overruling of Harding); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert.
denied, 252 Md. 731, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (allowing admission of hypnotically enhanced testimony); infra text accompanying notes 41-43. In Collins the Court of Appeals of
Maryland first addressed the question of whether a witness previously hypnotized could testify about the subject of the hypnosis. Thus the court never adopted the Harding rule developed by the Court of Special Appeals or its alternatives. The Court of Special Appeals faced
this question three times prior to Colh'ns. See State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 576-77, 414
A.2d 240, 244 (1980), rev'don other grounds, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981) (reaffirming
Harding); Pol/A, Harding. For an explanation of Fye, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
4. 296 Md. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044.
5. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infa note 71 and accompanying text.
6. Id. at 1014.
7. 296 Md. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034.
8. Id. at 671, 464 A.2d at 1029.
9. Id. at 676, 464 A.2d at 1032.
10. The case was tried before ajury on January 16, 1981. The jury was unable to agree
and a mistrial was declared. Collins was convicted as charged at a second trial from which
this appeal was taken. Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 187, 447 A.2d 1272, 1274 (1982).
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the murder." At the second trial appellee unsuccessfully sought to have
Davis' "hypnotically enhanced testimony" excluded. 2 At the second
trial, Davis testified that he was seated in Mrs. Collins' car when another car, identified by Mrs. Collins as her husband's, pulled up beside
them. Davis said that a man got out and approached, telling Davis to
get out of his "wife's car"; 3 the man pulled a rifle from the unoccupied
car and shot Mrs. Collins.1 4 After considering this testimony and other
5
evidence, the jury found Collins guilty of first-degree murder.'
In the Court of Special Appeals, Collins argued that Davis' hypnotically enhanced testimony should not have been admitted, because
statements made under hypnosis are not considered reliable by the relevant scientific community.' 6 The Court of Special Appeals agreed,
holding that until hypnotically enhanced testimony is considered reliable, it will be inadmissible.' 7

11. 296 Md. at 673, 464 A.2d at 1030. Davis was hypnotized by Dr. Edmond Delaney, a
Salisbury State College psychology professor. A special investigator with the State's Attorney's office for Worcester County was also present. The session was tape recorded. Id
12. Id. At the suppression hearing the state called as an expert Dr. Daniel Stern, a
clinical psychologist, assistant professor of psychology, and Director of the Investigative Hypnosis Institute. He testified that testimony given after hypnosis is no less reliable than other
testimony. He suggested certain procedures for hypnotizing a potential witness, including
using a trained and independent hypnotist with very limited knowledge of the crime being
investigated. The session should be taped and another person should attend. Id at 673-75,
464 A.2d at 1030-31.
The term "hypnotically enhanced" testimony was used by the court to describe testimony given by the subject of the hypnotic session after that session takes place. Id. at 670, 464
A.2d at 1029. The content of the testimony might differ completely from, expand, or be
exactly the same as, the prehypnotic testimony. Some courts refer to this kind of testimony as
being "hypnotically induced" or "hypnotically refreshed" rather than as "hypnotically enhanced," while others use all three synonyms interchangeably. See, e.g., State ex rel Collins v.
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 195, 644 P.2d 1266, 1281 (1982) (Feldman, J., supplemental
opinion); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 532, 432 A.2d 86, 89, 92 (1981).
13. 296 Md. at 676, 464 A.2d at 1031-32.
14. Id., 464 A.2d at 1032. Davis also testified that after Mrs. Collins was shot, he ran into
a truck stop to get help. Upon returning to the parking lot, he saw a man drive away in Mrs.
Collins' car. Id
The police found appellee's car and rifle at an adjacent truck stop. They brought
Collins from his house to the crime scene for a show-up with Davis, who was unable to identify Collins as the gunman. Id at 672, 464 A.2d at 1030. During interrogation, Collins told
the police that he visualized his wife driving off a boat ramp into water and suggested they
look at a particular ramp. Upon arriving, they found tire tracks leading to the water which
Collins said could have been made by his wife's car. After Mrs. Collins' body was found in
the Pocomoke River near this ramp, Collins was apprehended and charged. 52 Md. App. at
189-90, 447 A.2d at 1274-75.
15. 296 Md. at 671, 464 A.2d at 1029.
16. 52 Md. App. at 195, 447 A.2d at 1278. Appellee also presented two other unrelated
issues on appeal. 296 Md. at 672, 464 A.2d at 1029-30.
17. 52 Md. App. at 205, 447 A.2d at 1283. The court explicitly overruled its prior decisions permitting the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony at trial. Id; see supra note 3.

1984]

STATE V COLLINS

The Court of Appeals18 upheld the Court of Special Appeals' decision, agreeing that the general acceptance rule in Fge applied to hypnotically enhanced testimony."9 Based upon a review of the scientific
literature and judicial exposition on the subject, the court concluded
that the relevant scientific community did not regard hypnosis as a reliable means of eliciting accurate recall.2" Thus, as a general rule, a witness who has been hypnotized prior to trial may not testify unless the
proponent of that testimony can clearly demonstrate that the witness
made such statements prior to hypnosis.2 1 The court refused to enumerate the acceptable ways of showing that a statement has been made
prior to hypnosis, saying that to do so would risk excluding by implication acceptable methods not mentioned.22 Because Davis' testimony at
the second trial conflicted with his testimony at the first trial, his testimony was inadmissible. Collins was awarded a new trial at which Davis
would not be allowed to testify. 2"
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HYPNOTISM

Ancient civilizations experimented with hypnosis,24 but the modern
era began with Franz Mesmer, whose theory of animal magnetism supposed the existence of a healing "fluid" that could be stored in one person and transferred to another2 5 During the 1800's, natural science
18. The court granted the state's petition for a writ of certiorari and the appellee's conditional cross-petition. 296 Md. at 671, 464 A.2d at 1029.
Decided on the same day as Colhs were three other cases dealing with hypnotically
enhanced testimony, Grimes v. State, 297 Md. 1, 464 A.2d 1065 (1983) (per curiam); State v.
Metscher, 297 Md. 368, 464 A.2d 1052 (1983); Simkus v. State, 296 Md. 718, 464 A.2d 1055
(1983).
19. 296 Md. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034. For a discussion of the application of the Fye test
to hypnosis and other scientific procedures, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 683-700, 464 A.2d at 1035-43. The court took note of State ex rel Collins v.
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641
P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App.
3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); People v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387
(1981); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453
N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of PretrialHypnosis
on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 313 (1980); Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in
Court, 27 INT'L. J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311 (1979).

21. 296 Md. at 703, 464 A.2d at 1045.
22. Id. at 702-03, 464 A.2d at 1044-45.
23. Id at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044.
24. Hovec, Hypnosis Before Mesmer, 17 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 215, 215, 219 (1975)
(evidence tracing hypnosis back to ancient Greece, Egypt, China, Africa, and pre-Columbian
America).
25. Diamond, supra note 20, at 318 n.18 (citing F.A. MESMER, MEMOIRE SUR LA
DCOUVERTE DU MAGNETISME ANIMAL (GENEVA 1779)). See also L. CHERTOK, HYPNOSIS
3-11 (1966); 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPEDIA 133, 134 (15th ed. 1974) (Dr. M.
Orne is the author, a University of Pennsylvania psychiatry professor and founder of the
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under the leadership of Jean Marten Charcot seriously began to examine the conditions of hypnotism. 6 In the twentieth century, hypnosis
has been used in medicine2 7 and dentistry.2" Most importantly, it is
used as a valuable therapeutic tool in psychiatry and psychology.2 9
Despite this widespread use of hypnosis, experts still disagree about
its precise definition. Early theorists claimed it was sleep, or very much
like sleep, 30 but after much experimentation, most modern experts agree
that hypnosis is not sleep.3" Beyond this, there is little agreement, with
each segment of the scientific community emphasizing a different aspect
of hypnosis. Some experts define hypnosis as an altered state of con33
sciousness;3 2 others emphasize the subject's heightened suggestibility;
and a third group views hypnosis in terms of the subject's unusual
behavior.34 Embracing several competing views, the Council on Mental
Health defines hypnosis as "a temporary condition of altered attention
[in which the subject manifests] alterations in consciousness and

Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis) [hereinafter cited as BRITANNICA].
Puysegur, a follower of Mesmer, found that touching was unnecessary and that he could
influence a person just by talking to him. BRITANNICA, supra, at 134.
26. BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 134. This was in response to work done in England
which had branded hypnosis as "mesmeric humbug." See J. BRAMWELL, HYPNOTISM: ITS
HISTORY, PRACTICE AND THEORY 4-29 (1956) (detailing the history of hypnotism in England

during the 1800's).
27. H. CRASILNECK & J. HALL, CLINICAL HYPNOSIS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS
71-116, 147-222 (1975) (use in treatment of pain, cancer, dietary problems, and pediatrics);
BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 139; Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hpnosis, 168 J.
A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958); Dilloff, The Admissibity of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1977).
28. H. CRASILNECK & J. HALL, supra note 27, at 295-305; BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at
139.
29. H. CRASILNECK
HYPNODRAMA 39-45 (I.

& J.

HALL, supra note 27, at 223-251; GROUP HYPNOTHERAPY AND

Greenberg ed. 1977);

HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

399-401, 404 (V.

Patch & P. Solomon eds. 1974); BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 139; 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCY-

& NEUROLOGY 456-64 (B. Wolman ed. 1977).
30. Pawlow, The Identity of Inhibition with Sleep and Hypnosis, 17 ScI. MONTHLY 603 (1923)
(hypnosis is partial sleep). The word "hypnosis" is derived from "hypnos," the Greek word
meaning sleep. BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 133.
CLOPEDIA OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS

31.
TOK,

S. BLACK, MODERN PERSPECTIVES IN WORLD PSYCHIATRY 151 (1971); L. CHER-

supra note 25, at 40 (Americans have failed to find any evidence from EEG of similarity

between hypnosis and sleep); A. WEITZENHOFFER, HYPNOTISM: AN OBJECTIVE STUDY IN
SUGGESTIBILITY 97-99 (1953); Spiegel, Hypnosis and Evidence.- Help or Hindrance?,347 ANNALS

N.Y. ACAD. Scd. 73, 73 (1980) (hypnosis is the opposite of sleep).
32. Hilgard, Altered States of Awareness, 149 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 68, 71-75

(1969).
33. H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 13 (1967); Ey, Foreword to L.
CHERTOK, supra note 25, at ix; J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE

579 (2d ed. 1960); Diamond, supra note 20, at 333.
34. R. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 294-95 (5th ed. 1981) (quoting the British

Medical Association's definition of 1965); BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 133.
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memory, increased susceptibility to suggestion, and the production in
the subject of responses and ideas unfamiliar to him in his usual state of
mind."3 5 While fundamental uncertainty about the nature of hypnosis
has not prevented its profitable use in investigation by law enforcement
agencies, 36 this uncertainty has limited the usefulness of hypnosis in the
courts, where legal process demands greater certainty in conclusions
37
based on scientific procedures.
35. Council on Mental Health, supra note 27, at 187.
36. Monrose, Justice with Glazed Eyes. The Growing Use of Hypnotism in Law Enforcement,
JURIS DR., Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 54; Reiser, Hynosis as a Tool in CriminalInvestigations, POLICE
CHIEF 36 (Nov. 1976). At least 2000 police officers and detectives in the United States have
received various levels of training to allow them to use hypnosis to help individuals recall
events. C. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN LAw 211 (1983). Hypnosis proved instrumental in solving the Chowchilla kidnapping case. Under hypnosis the driver of the bus
carrying 26 kidnapped children was able to recall the license plate number of the kidnappers'
van. This clue was the pivotal lead in finding the kidnappers. Monrose, supra, at 54. See also
Kroger & Douce, Hypnotism in CriminalInvestigation, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 358 (1979) (describing cases in which hypnosis has uncovered valuable leads).
Both the courts and hypnosis experts support this investigatory use. Set, e.g., State ex
rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 206, 644 P.2d 1266, 1292 (1982) (Feldman, J.,
supplemental opinion) (hypnotically aided recall is valuable in the investigation of crimes
and other events); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1980) (investigatory use of
hypnosis allowed to help the witness remember verifiable factual information to provide new
leads); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 737, 649 P.2d 845, 847 (1982) (hypnosis is a valuable and important investigative procedure in police work); H. ARONS, supra note 33, at 27
(hypnosis can be most useful in investigative phases of criminal cases); But see People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 68 & n.55, 641 P.2d 775, 805 & n.55, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 273 & n.55, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982) (citing Orne, supra note 20, at 318) (use as an investigatory tool not
foreclosed, yet even objective facts can as easily be confabulated as accurately remembered);
Diamond, supra note 20, at 332 n.93 (usefulness as an investigatory tool is greatly
exaggerated).
37. The right of the defendant to be hypnotized has been recognized. Cornell v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 102, 338 P.2d 447, 449 (1959). For a discussion of Cornell,see Levy,
Hypnosis and the Law, 41 CHI. B. REC. 243, 243-45 (1960). Prior to Sirhan Sirhan's murder
trial, the defendant was hypnotized "to obtain information which might underpin a diminished capacity defense." Diamond, supra note 20, at 315 n.7. A defendant has the right to
consult with his attorney to prepare his defense. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Further, a defendant has the right to consult with other experts, like hypnotists and psychiatrists, to prepare his defense. Cornell, 52 Cal. 2d at 102, 338 P.2d at 479. But see State ex re.
Sheppard v. Koblentz, 174 Ohio St. 120, 122, 187 N.E.2d 40,41 (1962) (right to counsel does
not include the multitude of experts often employed in preparation of criminal cases).
Courts have uniformly not allowed a witness to testify in court while hypnotized. See,
e.g., Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113,1120-21 (W.D. Va. 1976) (disallowing defendant from testifying under hypnosis is not a due process violation); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 716, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974) (hypnotic evidence disallowed because
of unreliability, suggestibility, and possibility of false statements). A defendant did testify
under hypnosis in the courtroom, out of the jury's presence, in State v. Nebb, No. 39,540
(Ohio C.P., Franklin County, May 28, 1962). However, the case has no precedential value
because no ruling was made on the admissibility of this testimony. Herman, The Use of HypnoInduced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1964); Teitelbaum, Admissibility of
Hypnotically Adduced Evidence and the Arthur Nebb Case, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 209-10 (1963).
Recordings or transcripts of statements made by a defendant or witness in an out-of-
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Until recently, courts seldom addressed the issue of hypnotically
enhanced testimony.3 8 The use of such testimony is not specifically
mentioned in most rules of evidence39 and is discussed with polygraphs
and truth serums in evidence texts.4" The admissibility of hypnotically
court hypnotic session are also inadmissible. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 665-66,
602 P.2d 738, 753-54, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 833-34 (1979) (statements are unreliable); People v.
Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 727-28, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (1979) (dubious value of
statements outweighed by chance of misuse by jury); State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 241-42, 405
P.2d 492, 498 (1965) (these were self-serving statements made by defendant while not under
oath, so no guarantee of truthfulness).
Some courts have admitted statements by hypnotized defendants as a foundation for
a psychologist's opinion of the accused's mental condition or capacity for criminal intent. See,
e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 732-33, 382 P.2d 33, 39-40, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 230-31
(1963) (finding that these statements might be inadmissible for other purposes).
The testimony of the hypnotist as to what was said by the subject during a hypnotic
session is inadmissible. See People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665-66, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897).
Ebanks is the first American case in which hypnosis was at issue. Dilloff, supra note 27, at 2
n.3. For a brief discussion of Ebanks, see Annot., 23 A.L.R.2D 1310 (1952). See also People v.
Kester, 78 11. App. 3d 902, 909-10, 397 N.E.2d 888, 893-94 (1979) (disallowed as hearsay);
State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App. 2d 280, 285, 627 P.2d 1174, 1178 (1981) (analogous to evidence
adduced from lie detectors and truth serums); People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 72728, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (1979) (disallowed because unreliable); State v. Harris, 241 Or.
224, 241-42, 405 P.2d 492, 499-500 (1965) (too great a danger that jury will be confused).
38. Through 1967, only eight cases involving hypnotically enhanced testimony were decided, between 1968 to 1974, nine cases, and from 1975 to September 1980, 22. Note, The
Admirszbility of Testimony AwIenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1203 n.4 (1981). From
September 1980 to September 1983, over 30 cases were decided, six in Maryland alone. 3 F.
WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 630, at 252 n.20 (C. Torcia ed. 1973); id. at
114 (Supp. 1983); Annot., 92 A.L.R.3D 442, 461 (1979); id. at 11-12 (Supp. 1983).
39. Oregon has passed legislation dealing specifically with hypnotically enhanced testimony. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.675-.695 (1979) (setting forth requirements that must be
met before testimony will be admitted). For a discussion of this legislation, see Note, Hypnosz -Its Role and Current Admissibility in the Criminal Law, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 665, 690-92
(1981).
Under FED. R. EvID. 403, hypnotically enhanced testimony would be treated like any
other evidence and only excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury .....
See Note,
supra note 38, at 1220.
Civil courts have analogized hypnosis to the refreshment of a witness' memory by a
document. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller
v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974). For use of this rationale in a
criminal case, see State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-20, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-28 (1978).
The rules of evidence governing the armed forces deal specifically with hypnotically
enhanced testimony, disallowing its admission in a trial by court martial. MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL
142e (1969).
For judicial comment on the lack of codification, see United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d
825, 833 (2d Cir. 1969) (Moore, J., concurring); see also Comment, Hypno-Induced Statements.Safeguardsfor Admissibility, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORDER 99, 113.
40. McCormick mentions hypnosis in the same section as truth serums. C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 208, at 510 (2d ed. 1972). See inhfa note 68. Wharton treats hypnosis with truth serums and lie detectors. 3 F. WHARTON, supra note 38, at 24952.
Other commentators have argued that these scientific techniques are too dissimilar to
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enhanced testimony was, however, endorsed in an early Maryland case.
In Harding v. State,4 the Maryland court held that, although the victim
had told inconsistent stories before and after hypnosis, this inconsistency
and the fact that she had achieved her present knowledge through hypnosis went to the credibility of her testimony, not to its admissibility.
This conclusion was based on the hypnotist's testimony that no suggestion occurred to taint the victim's testimony, and on the victim's statement that her own recollection, not ideas implanted by hypnosis,
formed the basis of her testimony. 42 The defendant's complaint that the
hypnotist lacked adequate qualifications was also dismissed, the court
finding formal training unnecessary so long as the hypnotist had knowledge which would elevate his opinion above conjecture.4 3
Hardingwas a leading case for many years. Courts relied on its reasoning when faced with hypnotically enhanced testimony, but employed
little or no independent analysis of their own. These courts relied on the
44
witnesses' statements that they were testifying from their own memory
or assumed that cross-examination would enable the jury to determine
the witnesses' credibility.4 5 Neither Hardizg nor its progeny gave adequate attention to the literature on hypnosis. Hardingcited three prominent psychiatric experts whose position was that hypnosis was a
valuable and safe tool in a therapeutic setting.4 6 At the same time,
group together. Dilloff, supra note 27, at 22. Grouping the three together ignores the crucial
distinction between the use of hypnosis as a means of enhancing a witness' recollection and
the use of polygraphs and truth serum to elicit truth or demonstrate that the subject is lying.
Only a few cases have recognized the distinction. Se Hurd v. State, 86 N.J. 525, 537, 432
A.2d 86, 92 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 687-88, 643 P.2d 246, 251-52 (1981), cert.
quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982).
41. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
42. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306 (citing Borman v. State, I Md. App. 276, 229 A.2d 440
(1967); Carroll v. State, 3 Md. App. 50, 237 A.2d 535 (1967); Thompsen v. State, 4 Md. App.
31, 240 A.2d 780, (1967)).
43. Id. (citing Hewitt v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 243 Md. 574, 588-89, 221 A.2d
894, 902 (1966)). The hypnotist was Ralph P. Oropolo, Chief Clinical Psychologist at Clifton
T. Perkins State Hospital. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 305. But see Hurd v. State, 86 N.J. 525, 545,
432 A.2d 86, 96 (1981) (requiring the hypnotist to be an experienced psychiatrist or psychologist) and cases cited ifora note 60, adopting this requirement.
44. E.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975) (witness was testifying to her own recollection of events she had witnessed and knew her duty to tell the truth);
Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 122,
244 S.E.2d 414, 429 (1978) (the witness says testimony is her present recollection of events she
saw and heard).
45. E.g., Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1974) (witnesses were
cross-examined extensively and thoroughly); see also State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d
312 (1971).
Hypnosis experts have suggested that cross-examination is not effective. See 1)7fta note
67 and accompanying text.
46. 5 Md. App. at 246, 246 A.2d at 312. The authorities cited were A. NOYES & L. KOLB,
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Hardingignored scientific evidence of the suggestibility inherent in hypnosis4 7 and of the danger that the subject may confabulate or lie while

hypnotized.4 8 These drawbacks already had prompted much legal literature to condemn the hypnosis of witnesses. 49 Thus, the Hardng court
focused on the wrong literature and failed to consider the vast difference

between therapeutic and legal uses of hypnosis.5 ° Instead of basing its
decision on the safety of hypnosis in therapy, the court should have considered the dangers of its use in the legal sphere.
Recently, relying on literature published after Harding which denied that hypnosis can ever occur without dangerous suggestion,5 1
courts and commentators have criticized Hardingand similar early cases.
Recent cases suggest that the emphasis Harding put on the hypnotist's
statements that there was no suggestion was misplaced.5 2 Furthermore,
the post-Hardingliterature states that a witness is unable to distinguish

between recollections from prior observations and impressions implanted during hypnosis." The Harding court, therefore, also put too
much faith in the witness' belief that she was testifying from her own

recollections. 54

MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY

513 (1963); Speigel, Hypnosis. An Adjunct to Psychotherapy, in

COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY § 34.34 (A. Freedman, ed. 1967); Wolberg,
Hypnotherapy, in 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1466-81 (S. Arieti ed. 1959).

47. H. ARONS, supra note 33, at 14-15; A. WEITZENHOFFER, supra note 31, at 75; Hayward
& Ashworth, Some Problems of Evidence Obtained by Hypnosis, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. 469, 476; see
also People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 156, 310 N.W.2d 306, 311 (1981) (no scientific
articles before or after Hardingsupport its assertion of no suggestion).
48. WOLFE & ROSENTHAL, HYPNOTISM COMES OF AGE: ITS PROGRESS FROM MESMER
TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 104 (1948); Erickson, An ExperimentalInvestigation of the Possible Anti-Social
Use of Hypnosis, 2 PSYCHIATRY 391, 398-99, 404 (1939). Confabulation is the filling in of
memory gaps with inaccurate or fictitious bits of information. BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at
137. But see W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS 245 (1962) (extremely difficult for
subject to lie while in a deep trance).
49. Eg., Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 187-88 (1902); Note, Hypnotism and the Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1509, 1520 (1961); Note, Hypnotism, Suggestibihy and the
Law, 31 NEB. L. REV. 575, 593 (1952); But see Levy, supra note 37, at 246; Levy, Hypnosis and
Legal Immutabiliy, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 333, 333 (1955).
50. In its use as a therapeutic tool, hypnosis need not produce historically accurate memory; it need only revive memory or sharpen recall. In the legal context, however, historically
accurate recall is more important. Note, Pretrial Hypnosis and its Effect on Witness Competency in
Criminal Trials, 62 NEB. L. REV. 336, 352 nn. 110-11 (1983).
51. E.g., Diamond, supra note 20, at 333; Dilloff, supra note 27, at 19.
52. Eg., People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 156, 310 N.W.2d 306, 311 (1981); State
v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 1980).
53. BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 136; Diamond, supra note 20, at 314; Dilloff, supra note
27, at 5.
54. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 230, 624 P.2d 1274, 1278 (1981); People v. Gonzales,
108 Mich. App. 145, 156-57, 310 N.W.2d 306, 311-12 (1981) (hypnotized subjects are unable
to sort out accurately facts from distortions).
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A New Jersey case, Hurd v. State" illustrates the reaction to Hardng
and the resultant changes in the approach of some courts to hypnotically enhanced testimony. In Hurd the New Jersey court held that hypnotically enhanced testimony must satisfy the standard for admissibility
of scientific evidence established in Fye v. UnitedStates,56 admitting such

evidence only if there is "sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform
and reasonably reliable results." 5 7 After reviewing expert opinion on

the reliability of hypnosis, the court concluded that hypnotically enhanced testimony satisifes the Frye test in certain instances. However, it
was quick to point out that, improperly used, hypnosis could produce
extremely unreliable recall.5 8 Because of the possibility of misuse, the
court imposed specific safeguards. If hypnotically enhanced testimony
is to be admitted, then the hypnotist must be an expert and impartial
witness. Moreover, information given to the hypnotist about the crime,
and statements given by the subject both before and during the hypnosis, must have been recorded.5 9
Several courts have either followed Hurd or adopted similar safeguards.6 ° Others have concluded that the Hurd safeguards could not
overcome the inherent unreliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony

and would require wasteful case-by-case litigation.6 1 This position led
55. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
56. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
57. 86 N.J. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91 (quoting State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230 A.2d 384,
389 (1967)) (stating New Jersey's version of the Fe test).
58. Id. at 538-40, 432 A.2d at 92-94. See inja text accompanying notes 82-88 for a discussion of the reliability of hypnosis.
59. Id.at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
The complete set of guidelines were as follows:
1) an experienced psychiatrist or psychologist must conduct the session;
2) the hypnotist must be independent of defense or prosecution;
3) information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement or defense must be
recorded;
4) the hypnotist must obtain a statement of facts from the subject prior to hypnosis;
5) all contacts between the hypnotist and subject must be recorded; and
6) only the hypnotist and subject must be present during the hypnotic session.
Id.
denied, 290 Md.
60. See, e.g., Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 395, 427 A.2d 1041, 1049, cert.
719 (1981) (even after determination that hypnosis is generally accepted, must look at qualifications of the hypnotist and be sure test was conducted under the proper conditions); Harker
v. State, 55 Md. App. 460, 470, 463 A.2d 288, 294, cert. denied, 297 Md. 312 (1983) (since the
hypnotist was professional, objective, and gave no suggestions, use of hypnosis affirmed); see
also State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 689, 643 P.2d 246, 252-53 (1981) (specifically adopting
H'urdsafeguards); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 736-37, 649 P.2d 845, 847 (1982) (requiring Hurdsafeguards and a valid investigatory purpose).
61. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 207-08, 644 P.2d 1266,
1272-73, 1294 (1982) (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion) (safeguards are proper for investigatory use, but cannot insure reliability); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39-40, 641 P.2d
775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255-56, cert. denied 459 U.S. 860 (1982); State v. Palmer, 210
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to the current trend of finding hypnotically enhanced testimony inadmissible, or admissible only to the extent that the information was
known before the hypnotic session.
III.

THE COLLINS OPINION

In Col/ns, the Court of Appeals followed other recent decisions and
6 2 Instead the court
refused to adopt safeguards similar to those in Hurd.
held that hypnotically enhanced testimony is inadmissible in criminal
trials.6 3 The court specifically expressed doubts that the Hurdsafeguards
would eliminate the dangers at which each was directed. Furthermore,
the court reasoned that even if safeguards were sound in theory, they
would be difficult, if not impossible, to administer.6 4
Collins does not address the possibility that, once a previously hypnotized witness is disallowed from testifying, the opponent of that testimony might then seek to admit the favorable prehypnotic testimony.
For example, assume that prior to hypnosis the witness describes the
defendant and identifies him in a lineup as her attacker.65 After being
hypnotized, however, the witness says that she was mistaken and the
defendant looks nothing like her attacker. Following Colhins, the witness
would not be allowed to testify that the defendant was not her attacker.
However, the opinion does not address whether the prosecution could
seek to admit her previous description and identification to show that
the defendant was her attacker.
To admit this evidence would deny the defendant her right to effecSince the witness no longer believes her
tive cross-examination."
Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981) (guidelines require case-by-case determinations
that are neither sound nor practical); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 109, 436
A.2d 170, 176-77 (1981) (even with safeguards, would still be impossible for trier of fact to do
more than speculate on accuracy and reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Wyo. 1982) (frailties in post-hypnotic testimony requiring
safeguards occur in all testimony so would have to require these safeguards for all memory).
62. 296 Md. at 700, 464 A.2d at 1043; accord Shirly, 31 Cal. 3d at 39, 641 P.2d at 786-87,
181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
63. 296 Md. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044; accord Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 805,
181 Cal. Rptr. at 273; People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 161, 310 N.W.2d 306, 314
(1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 1980); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch,
496 Pa. 97, 111, 436 A.2d 170, 178 (1981).
64. 296 Md. at 700-01, 464 A.2d at 1044 (quoting Shirl.y, 31 Cal. 3d at 39-40, 641 P.2d at
787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56).
65. In this example, we ignore any possible problems of suggestibility inherent in the lineup identification itself.
66. The sixth amendment provides for a right of confrontation which includes the right
to cross-examine. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131-33 (1968). If the defendant cannot
effectively cross-examine a previously hypnotized witness, this right is denied if that testimony
is admitted. State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981); Commonwealth
v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981).
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prehypnotic statements to be true,6 7 she could not be cross-examined
effectively without defense counsel making reference to the inadmissible
post-hypnotic testimony. Thus, because the defendant's right to effective cross-examination would be denied, the prehypnotic testimony
must also be inadmissible.
A.

The Frye Test

In reaching its conclusion that hypnotically enhanced testimony is
inadmissible, the Colh'ns court applied the Frye test.' The court admits
that hypnotically enhanced testimony is not the type of evidence to
which Fye directly applies, because hypnotically enhanced memory differs from the results of mechanical testing.6 9 Yet, the court supplies no
reason why, in the absence of a strong analogy between memory and the
results of mechanical testing, Frye is applied to hypnotically enhanced
testimony.7 °
67. After hypnosis, the witness believes that the information brought out by the hypnotic
session is the "truth" to the exclusion of everything else. See E. HILGARD, HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY 166, 182 (1965); Diamond, supra note 20, at 348; Dilloff, supra note 27, at 9.
68. 296 Md. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034. Maryland adopted the FVe test in Reedy. State. See
bita notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
Other states have adopted the Fge test when examining hypnotically enhanced testimony. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 199, 644 P.2d 1266, 1285
(1982) (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 54, 641 P.2d
775, 796, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); People v. Gonzales, 108
Mich. App. 145, 149, 310 N.W.2d 306, 308 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768
(Minn. 1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 101, 436 A.2d 170, 172 (1981).
In a few states, Frye was found to be inapplicable to hypnosis. See, e.g., Brown v. State,
426 So. 2d 76, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Frye applicable only to admissibility of expert
opinion).
McCormick maintains that Frye is unduly restrictive and proposes a test of relevancy
which would weigh the probative value of such testimony against its prejudicial effect. C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 40, at 491. For a discussion of McCormick's approach, see Granelli,
The Admitsibility of Novel Scientific Evidence. Frye v. United States, A Ha/f Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1232-45 (1980).
69. 296 Md. at 679-80, 464 A.2d at 1033-34.
70. The court quotes State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980) to support its
adoption of the Fgre test:
Under the Frye rule, the results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible
unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where experts in the field
widely share the view that the results are scientifically reliable as accurate. Although hypnotically-adduced 'memory' is not strictly analogous to the results of
mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Fye rule is equally applicable in this
context, where the best expert testimony indicates that no expert can determine
whether memory retrieved by hypnosis, or any part of that memory, is truth, falsehood, or confabulation - a filling of gaps with fantasy. Such results are not scientifically reliable as accurate.
296 Md. at 680-81, 464 A.2d at 1034.
This passage supplies no reasoning to support the court's adoption of the Fye test. It
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The Fe test was fashioned to evaluate the admissibility of expert
testimony based on a lie detector test. 7 Maryland adopted the Fge test
in Reed v. State72 to evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony based
on the results of a voiceprint.7 3 In Colins however, the court was not
faced with the question of admissibility of expert testimony.74 Even the
result of the hypnosis, a transcript of the witness' statements while under
hypnosis,75 was not at issue. Rather, Collizs evaluated the admissibility
of witness testimony based on recall produced through hypnosis.
simply states that hypnosis is unreliable and therefore does not meet the test. Furthermore,
the Minnesota court misstates the Frye test as evaluating the admissibility of results of scientific technique rather than the expert opinion for which the test was developed. See infta note
71.
71. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (1923). The court disallowed the expert
testimony because it found the lie detector test was not "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. Fgye is
noted in 24 COLUM. L. REV. 429 (1924); 37 HARV. L. REV. 1138 (1924); Comment, The Use of
Psychological Tests to Determine the Credibility of Witnesses, 33 YALE L.J. 771, 773 (1924).
Fqre has been used to determine the admissibility of evidence derived from the
breathalyzer, State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 813-14, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978); blood
tests, State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 56, 622 P.2d 986, 991 (1981); hair analysis, United
States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 676 (W.
Va. 1980); Annot., 23 A.L.R.4TH 1199, 1209-10 (1983); identification of bite marks, People v.
Smith, 110 Misc. 2d 118, 124, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556 (1981); photographic dating, United
States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1981); polygraph, People v. Monigan, 72 Ill.
App. 3d 87, 94, 390 N.E.2d 562, 567 (1979); State v. Stewart, 116 N.H. 585, 588, 364 A.2d
621, 623 (1976); and voiceprint, United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408, 412 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Annot., 97 A.L.R.3D 294, 306-16 (1980).
72. 283 Md. 373, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
73. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377. Reedheld expert testimony based on a voiceprint inadmissible because voiceprints had not achieved general acceptance in the scientific community.
See Annot., 97 A.L.R.3D 201 (1980). For a discussion of Reed, see Note, Voice Identi/ication
Based on SpectrographicAnalysis Inadmissible Because the Technique Has Not GainedGeneralAcceptance
in the Scientific Community: Reed v. State, 39 MD. L. REV. 629 (1980).
74. Expert testimony on hypnotically produced recall is admissible in some jurisdictions.
See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 732-33, 382 P.2d 33, 39-40, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 23031 (1963) (allowed to state opinion on defendant's intent based in part on hypnotic examinations); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 30, 207 S.E.2d 414, 417-18 (1974) (may testify to extent of
knowledge learned of defendant's mental state).
Other courts disallow such testimony because of the unreliability of the underlying
hypnotic session. See, e.g., People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 877-78, 366 P.2d 314, 319-20, 16
Cal. Rptr. 898, 903-04 (1961) (refusal to admit based in part on failure to show hypnotist's
qualifications); State v. Conley, 6 Kan. App. 2d 280, 274, 627 P.2d 1174, 1177-78 (1981);
Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
75. This transcript is not admissible in most jurisdictions. See supra note 37.
Previously, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reasoned that the testimony of the
previously hypnotized witness in court is the result of hypnosis. Polk v. State, 48 Md. App.
382, 394, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048, cert. denied, 290 Md. 719 (1981). In his Colhs dissent, Chief
Judge Murphy states that "the 'result' of hypnosis is the ability to produce recall where there
was little or none before." 296 Md. at 710, 464 A.2d at 1048 (Murphy, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
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Despite the indirectness of the analogy, the court correctly concluded Fe applies to hypnotically enhanced testimony.7 6 Expert testimony based on the results of scientific procedure is disallowed when the
procedure is not accepted as reliable because the unreliability of the procedure will permeate the expert testimony. This is also true of hypnotically enhanced testimony. If hypnosis is not accepted as reliable, its
unreliability will permeate what the subject recalls under hypnosis and
eventually states on the witness stand.77 Furthermore, without Frye as a
guide, the courts would be forced into a case-by-case analysis of the reliability of the proffered testimony to determine its admissibility, wasting
judicial resources and risking conflicting decisions.7" By applying Fye,
unreliable evidence will be kept from the jury and the jury will be prevented from giving undue weight to evidence labelled as "scientific." 79
Once a court concludes that the Frye test should be used, it must
determine whether hypnosis is generally accepted as "reliable by the relevant scientific community."8 ° In a review of expert opinion on the reliability of hypnosis," the court recognized the problems inherent in
hypnosis. During hypnosis the subject is highly susceptible to suggestion
and it is impossible for the hypnotist to conduct the session free from all
suggestion.8 2 Furthermore, because memory does not record events
76. Id. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034.
77. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981) (credibility of recall stimulated by hypnosis depends upon reliability of hypnotic procedure). See in/ra notes 82-88 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the reliability of hypnosis.
78. Accord State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 196, 198 n.3, 644 P.2d
1266, 1282, 1284 n.3 (1982) (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion). But see infra notes 103-104
and accompanying text suggesting that a case-by-case determination of reliability is not eradicated through use of the Fe test.
79. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 641 P.2d 775, 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982) (dangerous tendency of lay jurors to give undue weight to scientific
evidence presented by experts with impressive credentials); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch,
496 Pa. 97, 102, 436 A.2d 170, 173 (1981) (trier of fact will accord uncritical and absolute
reliability to scientific device). But see Perry, The Trend Toward Exclusion of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-Has the Right Question Been Asked?, 31 KAN. L. REV. 579, 601 (1981) (if given
expert opinion, jury less likely to view hypnotic memory as true); Spector & Foster, The Admissibih'y of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law ofEvidence Susceptible? 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 595 (1977)
(with proper instructions the jury may be alerted to potential problems).
80. Nowhere in the opinion did the Collins court give its version of the Fgye test, but it
favorably quoted the language of the Court of Special Appeals. 296 Md. at 677-78, 464 A.2d
at 1032 (quoting Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 205, 447 A.2d 1272, 1283 (1983)). Previous Maryland cases have stated the Fgye test slightly differently. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 283
Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978) (gained general acceptance in particular field to
which procedure belongs); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 394, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048, cert.
denied, 290 Md. 719 (1981) (generally acceptable in the relevant scientific community).
81. 296 Md. at 695-700, 464 A.2d at 1041-43.
82. Id. at 696, 700, 464 A.2d at 1041, 1043 (quoting Diamond, supra note 20, at 333;
Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Resolution, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 452 (1979); International Society of Hypnosis, Resolution, 27 INT'L J.
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perfectly,8 3 the subject is likely to fill in gaps where no memory exists.8 4
It is impossible for either the hypnotist or subject to know if this has
occurred and it is equally impossible to distinguish between actual recollection and ideas implanted during hypnosis.8 5 Some experts also believe that a hypnotized subject can willfully lie.8 6 Finally, since the
subject believes hypnosis reveals what really happened, he becomes certain that his statements made under hypnosis are true8 7 and this certainty is projected to the jury, giving the jury a false impression of the
witness' credibility. 8 Therefore, the court concludes the Fye test is not
satisfied. 9
The objections to applying Fye are not persuasive. The court apparently reasons that the Fe test requires hypnosis to be reliable in
producing accurate recall. 9 If so, the court is subjecting hypnotically
enhanced testimony to a much stricter standard than other testimony.
For instance, while there is ample evidence to show that eyewitnesses'
testimony is unreliable and inaccurate,9 1 it is admissible.9 2 The jury is
the arbiter of its reliability and accuracy. Thus it seems inconsistent for
CLINICAL AND ExPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 453 (1979)); see Dilloff, supra note 27, at 4; A.
WEITZENHOFFER, supra note 31, at 133-34.
83. 296 Md. at 698-99, 464 A.2d at 1042-43 (quoting Orne, supra note 20, at 321. See E.
LoFTus, MEMORY 37 (1980) (memory is not like a computer). Some experts have propounded a videotape theory of memory, which states that every experience a person has is
recorded on his memory permanently. See H. ARONS, supra note 33, at 35.
84. 296 Md. at 698, 464 A.2d at 1041, 1042 (quoting Diamond, supra note 20, at 335; and
Orne, supra note 20, at 313). See BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 136.
85. 296 Md. at 697, 464 A.2d at 1042 (quoting Diamond, supra note 20, at 348). See
Speigel, supra note 31, at 79; Dilloff, supra note 27, at 9.
It is also difficult, if not impossible, for an expert to tell if the subject is actually
hypnotized or just faking. See Diamond, supra note 20, at 336-37; O'Connell, Shor & Orne,
Hypnotic Age Regression: An Empiricaland MethodologicalAnaysis, 76J. ABNORMAL PSCH. MONOGRAPH 1, 7 (1970); BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 137. But see H. ARONS, supra note 33, at
137-41 (outlining two methods for detecting faking); Spector & Foster, supra note 79, at 577-78
(tests exist which may allow hypnotists to tell if subject is hypnotized).
86. 296 Md. at 695, 698, 464 A.2d at 1042 (quoting Orne, supra note 20, at 313); see
BRITANNICA, supra note 25, at 139.
87. 296 Md. at 697, 464 A.2d at 1042 (citing Diamond, supra note 20, at 348); see supra
note 67 and authorities cited therein.
88. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 109, 436 A.2d 170, 175 (1981); Dilloff,
supra note 27, at 9; Spector & Foster, supra note 79, at 583.
89. 296 Md. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044; accordPeople v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 56, 641 P.2d
775, 797-98, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 266, cert. denzed, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
90. 296 Md. at 681, 464 A.2d at 1034; accordState v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 231, 624 P.2d
1274, 1279 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
91. For a discussion of the reliability of eyewitness testimony, see E. Lorrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 1-170 (1979); L. TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 1-66 (1982); A.
YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979).
92. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as
otherwise provided in these rules.").
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the court to require hypnotically enhanced testimony to be accurate
before admitting it, yet to admit regular eyewitness testimony without
this requirement. Instead, the Foye test should be used to determine if
hypnosis is reliable in producing more recall and let that recall be
judged, as all other recall is, by the jury. 3
If this suggestion is taken, however, the courts will again be faced
with one of the main problems the Fge test was intended to eradicatea case-by-case determination of the reliability of hypnotically enhanced
testimony.9 4 Furthermore, the jury would be faced with scientific evidence that may be difficult to comprehend. A major goal of the Fge
approach would be frustrated, for the danger that the jury may give
95
undue weight to scientific evidence would reappear.
Both the critics and proponents of Fge have generally failed to address the ambiguous nature of the "general acceptance" standard. The
standard seems to require "something less than unanimity, but more
than acceptance by the testifying expert," 9 6 but beyond this, the requirement is not clear. When delineating what constitutes "general acceptance" courts have given definitions no less ambiguous than the
standard itself. In State v. Mack,97 the Minnesota court stated that it
would find general acceptance when "experts in the field widely shared
the view" that hypnosis is reliable.98 The California court used different
phrasing in People v. Shirley99 when it did not find general acceptance
because "scientists significant in either number or expertise" opposed
hypnosis.' ° Maryland courts have been no more precise. In Reed,the
Court of Appeals held that the voiceprint was not generally accepted
because the technique was controversial and generally regarded as
experimental.' ' The Colli'ns court did not address the subject, thus
93. 296 Md. at 710-11, 464 A.2d at 1048-49 (Murphy, C.J., concurring and dissenting);
see also State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 213, 644 P.2d 1266, 1299 (1982)
(supplemental opinion) (Holohan, C.J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J.
525, 537-38, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 688, 643 P.2d 246, 252
(N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert.
quashed,98 N.M. 51,644 P.2d 1040 (1982); Dilloff, supra note 27, at
21-23; Perry, supra note 79, at 581; Spector & Foster, supra note 79, at 584.
94. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
95. See supra text accompanying note 79.
96. Strong, Questions Afeding Admisstbily of Scientifc Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 11.
97. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
98. Id.at 768.
99. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
100. Id at 56-57, 641 P.2d at 797-98, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266. See also Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174-75 (1981) (some members of scientific community oppose procedure).
101. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 398-99, 391 A.2d 364, 376-77 (1978). This seems implicitly to require that virtually the entire relevant scientific community must accept the technique as reliable before it may be used to provide evidence. Note, supra note 73, at 642.
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giving no idea as to what it would require for satisfaction of the standard with regard to hypnosis.
Without a clear definition of general acceptance, courts and litigants are forced into a "vague polling or nose counting" of those in the
scientific community."0 2 This allows future litigants to reargue the general acceptance standard in every case in which hypnosis is used. Simply by citing new sources and adding up those for and against hypnosis,
they can ask the court to reexamine the reliability of hypnosis. In fact,
the Reed court recognized this possibility."0 3 Thus, the problem of caseby-case determinations, supposedly erased by the application of Fye,'° 4
may reappear.
B.

The "Clear Demonstration" Exception

A logical extension of Fye would render all hypnotically enhanced
testimony inadmissible. The Colhns opinion does not go this far. If it
can be clearly demonstrated that the witness made the statements in
question prior to hypnosis, the witness may testify to those facts in
court. 0 5 However, Collins fails to explain how this clear demonstration
must be shown, reasoning since the court could not possibly envision all
possible means, it would risk leaving out acceptable solutions if a list
were given. 0 6 It suggests as one possible solution the guidelines laid
down by the Arizona Supreme Court.' 7 In State ex rel. Coli'ns v. Superior
Court,' O8 an appropriate record of the prehypnotic statements was required so that at trial the witness' testimony could be limited to
prehypnotic recall.'0 9 However, while mentioning these requirements
favorably, the Colh'ns court does not explicitly adopt them." 0
The failure of the court to formulate requirements does not frustrate the decision's goals. Although a few courts have accepted other
102. Note, supra note 73, at 636.
103. See 283 Md. at 399-400, 391 A.2d at 377 (its decision on general acceptance is subject
to reconsideration if, in the future, voiceprints achieve general acceptance).
104. See supra text accompanying note 78.
105. 296 Md. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044; accord State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132
Ariz. 180, 210, 644 P.2d 1266, 1295 (1982) (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion); State v.
Patterson, 213 Neb. 686, 692, 331 N.W.2d 500, 504 (1983).
106. 296 Md. at 702-03, 464 A.2d at 1044-45. See also State v. Patterson, 213 Neb. at 692,
331 N.W.2d at 504 (1983).
107. 296 Md. at 702, 464 A.2d at 1044-45.
108. 132 Ariz. 180, 193, 644 P.2d 1266, 1279 (1982) (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion).
109. Id at 210, 644 P.2d at 1296. This record must adequately show the witness' knowledge and recollection about the evidence in question. Id.
110. 296 Md. at 702-03, 464 A.2d at 1044-45. In Simkus v. State, 296 Md. 718, 464 A.2d
1055 (1983), the court pointed out that an even safer procedure than taking a written statement would have been to have had and introduced into evidence a videotape of what the
witness said prior to hypnosis. Id.at 727, 464 A.2d at 1060.
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means for showing that the witness gave the same testimony prior to
hypnosis,' in most cases the pre-hypnotic statements are written, taperecorded, or video-recorded. The small amount of litigation which may
be needed to decide on alternative means," 2 if and when they are used,
will not significantly burden the courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Collins, the Maryland Court of Appeals correctly reversed the
previous rule in Maryland which had freely admitted hypnotically enhanced testimony in criminal trials. Using the Fge test to evaluate this
testimony for the first time, the court concluded that hypnosis is not
generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community.
Therefore, unless the party offering the testimony can show that the witness made the statements in question prior to hypnosis, the testimony
will not be admitted. This is a sound rule which preserves the integrity
of criminal trials by keeping unreliable "scientific" evidence from the
jury until the process' ability to give sound results is proven. Until hypnosis can be better explained and its results proven accurate, hypnotically enhanced testimony should have no place in the courtroom.

I 1. See People v. Smrekar, 68 I1. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979); Merrifield v. State, 272 Ind. 579, 583, 400 N.E.2d 146, 149 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Taylor,
294 Pa. Super. 171, 175, 439 A.2d 805, 807 (1982), in which the courts allowed the witness to
make a post-hypnotic identification of the defendant in court because the witness had correctly identified the defendant prior to hypnosis. However, while not explicitly stated by the
courts, there seemed to be independent reasons for allowing the in-court identification, apart
from the pre-hypnotic identification.
112. See Note, supra note 50, at 358 n. 147 (lack of guidelines "invites more complicated
decisions in future, when, by suggesting simple safeguards and procedures to be followed, .
the court could have clarified matters for courts and investigators alike").

JONES

P.

STAFE-DEFENDANTS GAIN ACCESS TO GRAND
JURY TESTIMONY

In Jones v. Stale,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
defendant may inspect a prosecution witness' grand jury testimony for
cross-examination purposes after the witness has testified on direct examination without showing that the testimony is needed for anything
other than cross-examination. 2 Although formally requiring the defendant to show a "particularized need" 3 for the testimony,4 the court allowed the defendant access as of right in cases in which the grand jury
witness has testified for the prosecution at trial.5 Outlining the proper
role of a trial judge, the court also held that the trial judge may not
inspect grand jury testimony to determine if it is inconsistent with the
witness' trial testimony or to determine if the grand jury testimony
would be useful to the defendant.6 The state, in a motion for reconsideration, urged the court to return to the use of the limited particularized
need standard. The court denied the motion, but granted the state's
request to clarify certain issues. 7 In a separate clarifying opinion, the
court said that the state was not required to record and transcribe all
grand jury testimony,8 and that the grand jury judge has the discretion
to decide if the grand jury testimony should be recorded. 9
This Recent Decision will argue that, on the whole, the court's decision was correct. Although the Maryland court incorrectly relied on
several Supreme Court decisions and failed to delineate the policy reasons that do support its decision, the Jones holding is consistent with
both the historical trend to relax the prohibition on disclosing grand

1. 297 Md. 7, 464 A.2d 977 (1983).
2. Id. at 15, 464 A.2d at 981.
3. The term was first used by the Supreme Court in United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), when Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, said: "This 'indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings' must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity. There are instances when that need will outweigh the countervailing policy.
But they must be shown with particularity." Id at 682 (citations omitted).
4. See 297 Md. at 13, 464 A.2d at 980.
5. See infta
note 44 and accompanying text.
6. 297 Md. at 15, 464 A.2d at 981.
7. 297 Md. 21, 464 A.2d 984 (1983) (per curiam) (on motion for reconsideration). "In
the interests of judicial economy," the court granted the state's request to clarify certain issues. Id. Although as a practical matter, this clarification by the court carries considerable
weight, formally, it is mere dicta and therefore its status as precedent is, at best, debatable.
8. Id.at 22, 464 A.2d at 984.
9. Id
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jury testimony and the relevant policy considerations.'
The court also
properly defined the role of a trial judge in overseeing disclosure of the
testimony to the defendant, because allowing the judge to review the
transcript is inconsistent with present day notions of the adversary system. But by not requiring that all grand jury testimony be recorded
and by allowing the trial judge to review grand jury testimony for relevance, 1 the court failed to ensure that defendants will obtain whatever
testimony is necessary to impeach the state's witnesses.
Glenn Jones was tried for felony murder and robbery. Both before
and during the trial, Jones moved to inspect the grand jury testimony of
two principal government witnesses-Perkins Clanton and Kevin Lawson.' 2 Although Jones did not appeal the denial of the pre-trial motion,' 3 Jones did assert that the denial of similar motions that were made
following the direct examination of the witnesses was in error.' 4 The
trial judge had reviewed Clanton's grand jury testimony in camera'and concluded that it was not substantially different from his testimony
given on direct examination.' 6 Because he found no significant inconsistency between the trial testimony and the grand jury testimony, the
judge ruled that the defendant had not shown a particularized need for
the grand jury transcript.' 7 Thus he refused to allow Jones to inspect
the transcript. The trial judge concluded that Lawson's trial testimony
was different from his grand jury testimony, and Jones obtained the relevant portions. But defense counsel did not use the grand jury testimony during cross examination.'" The jury found Jones guilty, and he
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before the intermediate court
considered the case, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed the conviction.' 9

10. See bifra note 41.
11. 297 Md. at 17, 464 A.2d at 982.
12. Id at 10, 464 A.2d at 978. Lawson, age 13, was an eyewitness to the shooting. Brief
for Apellant at 2, Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 464 A.2d 977 (1983). Clanton, age 16, was a
participant in the robbery and also charged with murder. He agreed to testify for the state in
exchange for the state's recommendation that his case be transferred to juvenile court and his
bail be reduced. Id. at 5-6.
13. 297 Md. at 10, 464 A.2d at 978.
14. Id. The court said that "[tlhe parties appear to be in agreement that, ..
there is no
absolute right to inspect grand jury testimony prior to trial." Id., 464 A.2d at 979. Therefore
the entire issue of pre-trial discovery was not addressed.
15. Reportedly, the trial judge had taken the transcripts home and read them over the
weekend. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 464 A.2d 977 (1983).
16. See 297 Md. at 10, 464 A.2d at 978.
17. Id., 464 A.2d at 979.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 17, 464 A.2d at 982.
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I. BACKGROUND
American courts have opposed the disclosure of grand jury testimony because grand jury proceedings traditionally have been kept secret. The colonists imported the grand jury procedure, like other
constitutional protections, from Great Britain.2 ° Originally, the rule
barring disclosure was not intended to shield the prosecutor's case from
disclosure, 2 1 but was intended to protect the independence of the grand
jury by freeing it from manipulation by the sovereign. 22 By 1848, British fear of the Crown's meddling had subsided, and Parliament enacted
a statute providing for the preliminary examination of a defendant by a
magistrate. 23 Thereafter, a defendant could obtain a copy of witness'
deposition upon whose testimony he was brought to trial.24 In 1933,
Parliament abolished the grand jury and today "nobody mentions it,
25
nobody regrets it, and nobody is any worse off."
In the United States, however, the common law rule that no person
could be tried for an infamous crime except upon the presentment or
indictment of a grand jury became a constitutional right embodied in
the fifth amendment. 26 The Supreme Court has held that the fifth
amendment does not apply to the states, 2 7 but most state constitutions
20. The first regular grand jury in America was established in Massachusetts in 1635. L.
By 1683,
the institution was functioning throughout the thirteen colonies. Id.
Originaly called the Grand Assize, the grand jury was created in 1166 during the
reign of Henry II. Calkins, Grandury Secry,63 MICH. L. REV., 455, 456 (1965). At common
law, no person could be tried for a criminal offense, except upon the presentment or indictment of a grand jury. In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 621, 137 A. 370, 372 (1927).
Evidence and testimony were originally heard in open court, and the king controlled deliberations so that indictments were returned against his enemies. Calkins, supra, at 456-57. Later
custom towards holding private proceedings probably began to prevent the accused from
fleeing. See Knudsen, PretrialDisclosure of Federal Grandjugy Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REV. 423,
426 (1973). Largely as a result of the Earl of Shaftesbury Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681), the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings was guaranteed to prevent tampering by the king. See
Murray & Conway, Pre-Trial Discovery of Federal Grandjuqv Minutes, 49 L.A. B. BULL., 172, 175
(1974).
21. Calkins, supra note 20, at 458.
22. See Murray & Conway, supra note 20, at 176 ("But for the despotic practices of the
sovereign, grand jury secrecy would never have been necessary."); cf. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the GrandJuy, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 710 (1972) (use of grand
jury to effect political ends).
23. Indictable Offenses Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., ch. 42, §§ 1, 27.
24. Murray & Conway, supra note 20, at 176.
25. Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English GrandJuy, 29 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1938-39); accordCalkins, supra note 20, at 469 n.50 ("The argument for retention, that the grand jury might be a protection of accused persons against oppression, did not
convince the English.").
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE & ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 13 (1975).
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contain similar provisions.2" Additionally both federal and state courts,
oblivious to the differences between English monarchism and American
republicanism,2 9 automatically adopted the requirement that grand
jury proceedings be conducted in private.3" But the courts did not
adopt the view that complete secrecy in grand jury proceedings was a
necessary component of a defendant's constitutional right to be indicted
by a grand jury. The courts took the position that allowing a defendant
to see grand jury testimony would unfairly advantage him.3 ' The bar
against disclosure of grand jury proceedings during deliberations is still
absolute, 32 but the rule against disclosure after the grand jury has
returned an indictment has slowly eroded in both federal and state
33
courts.
28. "So jealously have the people generally regarded this requirement [of a grand jury
proceeding] as a safeguard to liberty, that it is embodied in some form in most, if not all, of
the constitutions." In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 621, 137 A. 370, 372 (1927).
Article XXI of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, a defendant has the "right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy
of the Indictment." Nonetheless, in Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 464, 85 A.2d 43. 47 (1951),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland said that while this Article confers upon the defendant the
right to be apprised of the charge, it contains no guarantee as to form. Indictment by grand
jury in Maryland, therefore, is a product of the common law. Id. See also Moaney v. State, 28
Md. App. 408, 412-13, 346 A.2d 466, 470 (1975).
29. The grand jury became an issue as state conventions met to ratify the United States
Constitution. The movement, led by Massachusetts, which culminated in the grand jury's
inclusion in the fifth amendment, resulted mainly from the key role the institution played
against the Crown in the years immediately preceding the Revolution, as well as the fear of
the new central government which was being created. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL
45 (1963).
30. See Calkins, The Fading Myth of GrandJuySecrecy, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 18, 23
(1967) (secrecy adhered to "with almost a religious fervor").
31. See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand, J.).
[Pre-trial discovery in general] is said to lie in discretion, and perhaps it does, but no
judge of this court has granted it, and I hope none ever will. Under our criminal
procedure the accused has every advantage. . . . Why in addition he should in
advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make
his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see.
Id.; cf.Arenella, Reforming the State GrandJury System: A Model GrandJuiyAct, 13 RUTGERS L.J.
1, 8 (1981) ("Ironically, an institution that was given constitutional stature because of its
protective function has been retained for its capacity to enhance the prosecutor's power to
investigate criminal activity."); Knudsen, supra note 20, at 428.
[Tihe grand jury developed in England and entered the stream of American
tradition as a protection for the personal rights of the people. . . . The pendulum
has now swung so far that grand juries have been called the "prosecutor's alter ego,"
and prosecuting attorneys vigorously uphold grand jury secrecy as a means of protecting their cases from discovery by the defendant.
Id.
32. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 106 n.7 (2d ed.
1982); Knudsen, supra note 20, at 428.
33. See Calkins, supra note 30, at 24 n.22; see also Traynor, GroundLost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 229 (1964) ("What [Learned Hand and others who share his
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The law governing the disclosure of grand jury testimony in federal
courts is different from the law in state courts. The federal courts prior
to 1970 used the particularized need standard to decide if the government was required to turn over grand jury testimony to a defendant.
Finding that disclosure of relevant materials, rather than their suppression, would promote the proper administration of justice,3 4 the Supreme
Court applied the particularized need standard in Denn's v. Untied
States35 and allowed the defendant to inspect grand jury testimony of a
witness for cross-examination purposes after the witness had testified on
direct. 36 Although the Court has not clearly defined particularized
need, 37 most federal courts have interpreted Denni's to mean that a defendant may inspect the grand jury testimony of a witness after the witness has testified on direct.38 The definition of particularized need,
however, is no longer an issue in federal criminal trials because in 1970
the Jencks Act 39 was amended to guarantee a defendant access to the
grand jury testimony of a government witness, after the witness has testified on direct examination.' Disclosure of grand jury testimony in state

view] overlook is that the protection afforded the defendant against discovery is in large measure counterbalanced by the abundant resources for investigation available to the prosecution
and the corresponding opportunity it has to guard against perjury and witness tampering.").
34. 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
35. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
36. Id. at 869.
37. CompareTraynor, supra note 33, at 230 ("No one seems quite certain about the particulars of particularization."), with Note, Impeaching the Prosecution Witness.- Access to GrandJury
Testimony, 28 U. Pirr. L. REV. 338, 343 (1966) ("the Court cited Pittsburgh Plate Glass in Dennis
as supporting the requirement of 'particularized need,' while, at the same time, they emaciated the requirement").
38. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 433 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane); United
States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v.
United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir.
1967); United States v. Cullen, 305 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Wis. 1969). See also 1 C. WRIGHT,
supra note 32, § 108, which states: "It seems to be a fair reading of Dennis that defendant
should always have access to the grand jury testimony of witnesses who testified against him
at trial."
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
40. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court held that a defendant had
a right to obtain reports made by government witnesses to the FBI for use during crossexamination. Reflecting this decision, Congress enacted the Jencks Act which stated:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the
court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement . . . of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to
the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1957). In 1970, the Act was amended so that "statement" expressly
included "a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by
said witness to a grand jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3) (1970). The amendment was in response to rulings that the statute did not apply to grand jury testimony. See Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959), in which the Court said: "[Jencks] had
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courts is still a controversial issue. State courts have adopted three distinct positions to govern the disclosure of grand jury testimony of a witness who has testified on direct: the defendant has a right to the
testimony;" the defendant must demonstrate that he has a particularized need for the testimony;4 2 and the defendant may not inspect the
grand jury testimony.43 Before the decision in theJones case, Maryland
courts had used the particularized need standard.
II.

THE JONES DECISION

Although the court itself maintained that it was merely explaining
the meaning of "particularized

need," the Court of Appeals in Jones

changed Maryland law so that a defendant need not meet the traditional particularized need standard.

Under the guise of clarifying the

particularized need standard,4 4 the court adopted the position of states
that allow a defendant

to obtain the grand jury testimony after the

state's witness has testified on direct. In addition, the court relied upon
Supreme Court precedent that does not support the conclusion reached

in Jones. Although the Maryland court incorrectly relied on precedent,

nothing to do with grand jury proceedings and its language was not intended to encompass
grand jury minutes. Likewise, it is equally clear that Congress intended to exclude those
minutes from the operation of the so-called Jencks Act." Cf id.at 408 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (After acknowledging at page 403 n.2 that the Jencks Act did not affect discovery of
grand jury testimony, Brennan, who wrote the Court's opinion inJencks, said the considerations inJencks "obviously apply with equal force to the grand jury testimony of a government
witness.").
41. See Parlapiano v. District Court, 176 Colo. 521, 527, 491 P.2d 965, 968 (1971) (en
banc); State v. Canady, 187 Conn. 281, 283, 445 A.2d 895, 897 (1982); People v. Johnson, 31
Ill. 2d 602, 608, 203 N.E.2d 399, 402 (1964); Antrobus v. State, 253 Ind. 420, 430, 254 N.E.2d
873, 878 (1970); State v. Cuevas, 282 N.W.2d 74, 82-83 (Iowa 1979); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 365 Mass. 99, 105-06, 309 N.E.2d 470, 475 (1974); People v. Wimberly, 384 Mich. 62, 68,
179 N.W.2d 623, 626 (1970); Shelby v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 82 Nev. 204, 210-11, 414
P.2d 942, 945 (1966); State v. DiModica, 40 N.J. 404, 411, 192 A.2d 825, 829 (1963); State v.
Felter, 85 N.M. 619, 620, 515 P.2d 138, 139 (1973); People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 173
N.E.2d 881, 884, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 451 (1961); State v. Hartfield, 290 Or. 583, 592, 624 P.2d
588, 593 (1981) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Columbia Inv. Corp., 457 Pa. 353, 369, 325
A.2d 289, 297 (1974); State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 352-53, 345 P.2d 186, 187 (1959); see also
Burkholder v. State, 491 P.2d 754, 757 (Alaska 1971) (defendant entitled to grand jury transcript to determine sufficiency of indictment).
42. See State v. Superior Court, 95 Ariz. 319, 332, 390 P.2d 109, 118 (1964) (en banc);
State v. Mahaney, 437 A.2d 613, 619 (Me. 1981); State v. Palmigiano, 112 R.I. 348, 360, 309
A.2d 855, 862 (1973); State v. Bad Heart Bull, 257 N.W.2d 715, 723 (S.D. 1977).
43. See State v. Prestridge, 399 So. 2d 564, 582 (La. 1981); State v. Purrington, 122 N.H.
458, 462, 446 A.2d 451, 453-54 (1982); State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 689, 281 S.E.2d 377, 384
(1981).
44. See 297 Md. at 11, 464 A.2d at 979; see also 297 Md. 21, 24, 464 A.2d 984, 985 (1983)
(per curiam) (on motion for reconsideration) ("What the holding did was to explain what
'particularized need' was.").
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policy considerations, unmentioned in the majority opinion, do support
its holding.
A.

Precedent

Before Jones Maryland courts took the position that a defendant is
not entitled to inspect grand jury testimony unless he shows that he has
a particularized need. 5 In Grimm v.State,46 the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland denied the defendant the testimony of the only witness
who had testified before the grand jury.4 7 Rejecting the claim that this
denial seriously affected the defendant's ability to impeach the witness
at trial, 48 the court found that the defendant had not shown any particularized need .4 9 The court in Jones, however, reasoned that a defendant
would be unable to demonstrate any special need for the grand jury
testimony to impeach the witness without first inspecting it." Thus the
Jones court held that a desire to use grand jury testimony for cross-examination of a state witness automatically constitutes particularized need.
This position had been implicitly rejected in Grimm when the court said
that a defendant did not have an automatic right to inspect a witness'
grand jury testimony to determine if it could be used on crossexamination. 5'
The court also argued that the decision in Jones was consistent with
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Strathen. 2 In Strathen Chief Justice Murphy said that "in a proper case an accused may, at trial, be afforded
access to grand jury minutes for purposes of cross-examination or im53
peachment if he demonstrates a 'particularized need' for disclosure."
After quoting this language, the Jones court concluded that "consequently, the Jones holding was not a change of the law; it merely ex45. 297 Md. at 12, 464 A.2d at 980 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Strathen, 287
Md. 111, 411 A.2d 102 (1980); Thomas v. State, 50 Md. App. 286, 437 A.2d 678 (1981), cert.
denied, 292 Md. 639 (1982)).
46. 6 Md. App. 321, 251 A.2d 230 (1969) (Murphy, C.J.).
47. Id.at 331, 251 A.2d at 236.
48. Id., 251 A.2d at 237.
49. Id.at 331-32, 251 A.2d at 237 (quoting trial judge John E. Raine, Jr. who said: "If
this defendant is entitled to a transcript of the Grand Jury proceedings then I cannot think of
any criminal cases, be it felony or misdemeanor, where a defendant could not obtain the
Grand Jury testimony . . .').
50. 297 Md. at 14, 464 A.2d at 981; cf.United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.
Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (Marshall, C.J.), quoted in Traynor, supra note 33, at 230 ("Now, if a
paper be in possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or applicability
can be expected from the person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its
contents?").
51. 6 Md. App. at 331, 251 A.2d at 237.
52. 287 Md. 111, 411 A.2d 102 (1980), cited in 297 Md. at 11, 464 A.2d at 979.
53. 287 Md. at 117, 411 A.2d at 106 (dictum), quoted b7 297 Md. at 11, 464 A.2d at 979.
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plained the 'particularized need' referred to in Strathen."5 4 On the
contrary, in Strathen, the court implied that use for cross-examination
and particularized need were not the same thing. The court said that a
defendant would gain access '"orpurposes of cross-examination . . . if
he demonstrates a 'particularized need' for disclosure." 55 Additionally,
in Jones the court made it clear that a witness' grand jury testimony need
not be inconsistent with his testimony at trial in order for a defendant to
gain access to the grand jury transcript; the release of the transcript may
not be conditioned upon a trial judge's in camera finding of inconsistencies between the witness' trial testimony and his grand jury testimony.
Thus, prior to Jones, a Maryland trial judge could deny a defendant the
transcript if no inconsistencies were found, but now a denial on such
grounds would be reversible error. The court nevertheless persistently
56
claimed that its holding in Jones did not change Maryland law.
It is possible that the court did not intend to divest the particularized need standard of all meaning in this context. In Jones, defendant's
motions for disclosure of Clanton's and Lawson's grand jury testimony
were made following direct examination and prior to cross-examination.
The trial judge did not deny the motions until cross-examination had
begun. The court may have meant that some type of need, such as establishing on cross-examination that the witness testified before the
grand jury on relevant matters, be demonstrated. This does not seem
likely, however, as demonstrated by the court's rather explicit language
and the absence of any reference to such minimal requirement. Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals appears to have interpreted Jones to
foreclose the necessity of laying a foundation during cross-examination
as a prerequisite for disclosure.5
Although numerous state courts have addressed the issue of when
to disclose grand jury testimony to a defendant,5" the Maryland court
chose to turn to Supreme Court decisions dealing with the issue. As
pointed out previously, Supreme Court precedent including Dennis and
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,59 has been superceded by the
1970 Amendment of the Jencks Act, now embodied in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 26.2(f)(3).6' Criminal defendants in federal court
currently may obtain a government witness' grand jury testimony once
54.
55.
56.
within
57.
58.
59.
60.

297 Md. at 24, 464 A.2d at 985.
287 Md. at 117, 411 A.2d at 106 (emphasis added).
See 297 Md. at 24, 464 A.2d at 985 (court denied it had changed the law four times
a single page).
See Ellison v. State, 56 Md. App. 567, 577-78, 468 A.2d 413, 418 (1983).
See supra notes 41-42.
360 U.S. 395 (1959).
See supra note 40.
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the witness has testified. None of these Supreme Court cases is binding
precedent for a state court, because the Supreme Court has not held
that a defendant in state court has a right to grand jury testimony as a
matter of due process under the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution.
The Jones court incorrectly relied upon several cases in which the
Supreme Court applied the particularized need standard.6 Douglas Oil
Co. v. PetrolStops Northwest6 2 is inapposite because it was a civil proceeding in which the issue was the standard by which a plaintiff may obtain
testimony from a grand jury investigation of the defendant. The Jones
court quotes United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.6 3 in which the Supreme
Court said in dictum: "[T]he use of the grand jury transcript at the trial
to. impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility
and the like . . . are cases of particularized need where the secrecy of
the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly."6 4 On its face, this
passage seems to support the decision that use for cross-examination
constitutes particularized need. But subsequent cases, such as Pittsburgh
Plate GlassP5 and Dennis,66 which both quoted Proctor & Gamble, make it
clear that some further showing of need tied to the facts of the particular
case is necessary.
The court's reliance on Pittsburgh Plate Glass is perplexing. The
Jones court did note that the Pittsburgh Plate Glass court denied disclosure
of the transcript because the defendants failed to show the existence of
particularized need.6 7 The defendants in both Pittsburgh Plate Glass and
inJones had only demonstrated that the "trial witness testified before the
The Supreme Court expressly degrand jury-and nothing more."'
nied that the rationale of the Jencks Act-delivery as of right for crossexamination-was applicable to grand jury testimony.69 It is the dissent
in PittsburghPlate Glass that found that Procter& Gamble was authority for
permitting discovery of a witness' grand jury testimony for use on cross-

61. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677 (1958).
62. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
63. 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
64. Id. at 683, quoted in 297 Md. at 13, 464 A.2d at 980.
65. See 360 U.S. at 399.
66. See 384 U.S. at 870.
67. 297 Md. at 14, 464 A.2d at 980.
68. 360 U.S. at 399. The defendant in Jones made the same showing as the defendant in
Pittsburgh Plate Class. See 297 Md. at 19, 464 A.2d at 983 (Menchine, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Appellant has shown no more than that a witness at trial had testified before the grand
jury.").
69. 360 U.S. at 399.
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examination7" and called for application of the Jencks rationale. 7 The
court's reliance on Denni's is similarly misplaced. In Denni's, the Supreme
Court did allow the defendant to inspect the grand jury testimony, but
did so because the defendant's showing went "substantially beyond the
minimum." The particular facts in Denni'ssupported a finding of particularized need.7 2 Thus the Jones court failed to establish precedent by
relying upon Supreme Court cases that are either distinguishable or superseded, and compounded that error by misapplying the reasoning of
the Court's decisions.
B.

Pohcy

Although the Supreme Court cases mentioned in Jones do not support the result reached by the Court of Appeals, the court correctly
adopted a liberal definition of particularized need because the reasons
for barring disclosure of a witness' grand jury testimony are not applicable after a witness has testified at trial. The five major reasons for preserving the secrecy of grand jury procedures are: to protect the accused
who is later exonerated from public exposure, to prevent escape of the
accused before he is indicted, to ensure that grand jury deliberations are
free from outside influence, to protect grand jury witnesses who may
later appear at trial, and to encourage open discussion by witnesses
before the grand jury.7 3 These reasons for secrecy are eliminated once a
government witness testifies at trial.74 First, the grand jury has not exonerated the defendant; he is being publicly tried and the state can no
longer prevent its case against the defendant from being openly reported. Second, the defendant has been indicted and thus knows he is
under investigation. At this point in the criminal process, setting bail is
the appropriate means of preventing escape. The first two reasons for

70. Id. at 404 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id.at 408.
72. 384 U.S. at 872. The record showed the following circumstances: some of the grand
jury testimony was fresher than the trial testimony by 15 years; the motions involved key
witnesses, two of whom were accomplices, one being a paid informer, another being hostile to
the defendant; their testimony was largely uncorroborated; one of them admitted mistakes in
earlier statements about significant dates. d.
73. 356 U.S. at 681-82 n.6; accord United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.
1954); United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931).
The Court also included protection of the accused who is exonerated from the expense of standing trial where there is no probability of guilt. However, this is a reason for
maintaining the institution of the grand jury rather than for preserving the secrecy of its
proceedings.
74. Calkins, supra note 30, at 25 ("Once a witness has testified, there would seem to be no
reason whatever for withholding his grand jury minutes."); see Knudsen, supra note 20, at 442;
Sherry, GrandJuryMinutes.- The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. REV. 668, 681 (1962).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 43:612

preserving grand jury secrecy, therefore, are simply no longer relevant
once the defendant has been indicted.
Additionally, once the trial begins, the grand jury's deliberations
are finished and outsiders have no opportunity to influence the jurors
during their deliberations. Safeguards, such as excising specific information from the testimony revealed to the defendant, may be instituted to
prevent any chilling effect which may restrain the activities of future
grand jurors. In federal court, grand jury deliberations and voting are
excluded from the record.75 The trial judge or the prosecutor should be
required to delete the names of grand jurors who had interjected questions, 76 or during the grand jury proceedings the questioner should be
recorded as "grand juror." Either procedure would ensure consistent
anonymity of the grand jury and prevent any chilling effect which
might otherwise arise. Thus grand jurors remain protected because the
rule of secrecy remains in force during deliberations; if grand jurors
know that their identity will be kept secret they will be less susceptible
to outside influence.
A defendant who is bent on tampering with a grand jury witness is
not deterred from undertaking this criminal action by the state's refusal
to disclose the grand jury transcripts of its witnesses. In Maryland, as a
part of a pre-trial discovery and upon request of the defendant, the state
is required to disclose the name and address of each person it intends to
call as a witness.7 7 Of course, a witness' identity need not be disclosed if
a substantial risk of harm outweighs the interest in disclosure, 78 but once
the witness has testified at trial, this safeguard has no deterrent effect.
Thus, although refusing to disclose the witness' name and the text of the
witness' grand jury testimony before trial may well prevent an accused
from interfering with a state's witness, it is incorrect to assume that refusing to disclose grand jury testimony after the witness has testified at
trial will have the same deterrent effect. An honest accused should not
be deprived of a means of presenting his defense simply because a few
defendants may misuse such an opportunity.7 9
Finally, keeping the grand jury testimony of witnesses who have
testified on direct secret is wholly ineffective in encouraging free and
open disclosure before future grand juries. A grand jury witness is well
75. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(l); accord MODEL GRAND JURY Act § 103 (1982).
76. See Note, Disclosure of Grandjuy Minutes to Challenge Indictments and Impeach Witnesses in
Federal CrininalCases, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 1194 (1963).
77. See MD. R.P. 4-263(b)(1).
78. MD. R.P. 4-263(c)(3).
79. Brennan, Remarks on Discove, 33 F.R.D. 56, 63 (1963); accord Goldstein, The State and
The Accused. Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1193 (1960).
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aware that he may be required to repeat any portion of his testimony,
including his most damaging testimony, during direct examination. 0
Thus, grand jury witnesses will not be more willing to talk, even if they
know that their grand jury testimony will not be disclosed."1 All that
will be lost is the prosecutor's complete discretion to choose which portions of the witness' testimony he will use at trial. A prosecutor may be
able to encourage some witnesses to testify before a grand jury by intimating that at trial such testimony will be used selectively, but the witness must trust the prosecutor's discretion. The prosecutor, not the
grand jury witness, is the beneficiary of the policy against subsequent
disclosure. Of course, the witness would be harmed if he had committed
perjury, 2 but in that event he should not be protected. 3
In sum, the five reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy-protecting the accused from public exposure before indictment, preventing
the accused from escaping, ensuring that grand juries deliberate freely,
protecting grand jury witnesses who may later testify, and encouraging
open discussion during grand jury proceedings-do not justify a complete bar against the disclosure of grand jury testimony. Once a government witness has testified at trial, the reasons for keeping the testimony
secret are no longer relevant. Moreover, lack of secrecy has not proved
detrimental in the states where disclosure to the defendant is allowed. 4
In California, for example, where disclosure has been available the longest time, 5 there has been "no discernible effect whatever on the effectiveness or utility of the grand jury." 6 In federal courts, subsequent
80. See Calkins, supra note 20, at 445; see also Knudsen, supra note 20, at 444 (prosecutor
would be remiss in his duty if he failed to advise a government witness, who due to ignorance
or naivete failed to recognize this fact).
81. "Though in theory the possibility of later cross-examination might discourage full
disclosure by citizens who have information about possible crimes by making the grand jury
proceedings less informal, the experience of those states in which the defendant receives a
transcript of the grand jury proceeding before the trial does not show that lack of secrecy is in
any way detrimental to grand jury operation." Note, GrandJuy---FutureDefendants Entitled to
Witnesses' GrandJuy Testimony Without Showing of Particularzed Need.-United States v. Young.
blood, 379 F2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967), 81 HARV. L. REV. 712, 714-15 (1968); cf. Note, supra note
76, at 1194-95 ("Were a witness aware that his grand jury statements would later be made
public or used to impeach any subsequent trial testimony, he might be less willing to engage
in the kind of open-ended testimony that so often reveals highly probative material ...
[Nonetheless] its virtues outweigh this one possible drawback.").
82. See Note, Defense Access to Grandjury Testimony: A Right in Search of a Standard, 1968
DUKE L.J. 556, 564 n.46 ("[T]his revelation is the very reason for which inspection is
sought.").
83. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2362 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
84. See Murray & Conway, supra note 20, at 200; Note, supra note 81, at 714-15; Note,
Dennis v. United States, 384 US 855 (1966)-Disclosure of Grandjuy Testimony for Purpose of
Cross-Examinaton,62 Nw. U.L. REv. 233, 241 (1967).
85. Knudsen, supra note 20, at 444 n. 122 (available since 1897; compulsory since 1927).
86. Sherry, supra note 74, at 681. See study in Knudsen, supra note 20, at 444-52; accord
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disclosure of related grand jury testimony of government witnesses is
available as a matter of course under the Jencks Act, and the grand
jury's ability to obtain testimony has not been inhibited.8 7
C

Other Considerattons

Most courts, including the Maryland court in the Jones case, correctly have recognized that a judge's in camera review of grand jury
testimony (a necessary procedure in courts that adopt the particularized
need standard) is often unworkable. The court in Jones adamantly
maintained that the trial judge may not condition disclosure upon inspection of the grand jury testimony to determine whether inconsistencies exist or whether the testimony would be of use to the defendant.88
A trial judge should not be assigned the task of examining voluminous
grand jury testimony for inconsistencies. Such a process is time-consuming and, furthermore, it forces the judge to decide in isolation whether
evidence may be useful to one party without the benefit of an open discussion between adversaries. The Supreme Court has said that "even
the most able and experienced trial judge" would be faced with a formidable task of not only reading the entire transcript of each witness'
grand jury testimony, but also meticulously comparing it to each witness' trial testimony to discover any inconsistencies.8 9 That task becomes insurmountable when viewed in light of the time constraints and
pressures under which a judge must function while conducting a trial.'
In Jones, for example, the trial judge reviewed one witness' testimony
during two brief recesses, but only after initially attempting to do so at
the bench.9"
Note, CriminalProcedure." Federal Dicoveiy. Apphation of the Poliy of Secrecy of Grandjuiy Testimony as a Limitation on the Right of Discovery After Witness Has Testifiedat Trial-Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States (U.S 1959), 48 CALIF. L. REV. 160, 162 (1960).
87. Recent pleas to reform the grand jury system in order to ensure fairness serve notice of
its continued effectiveness. See, e.g., Gerstein & Robinson, Remedy for the Crandjury. Retain but
Reform, 64 A.B.A. J. 337 (1978).
88. 297 Md. at 15, 464 A.2d at 981.
89. 384 U.S. at 874 (quoting 360 U.S. at 410 (Brennan, J., dissenting)), quotedin 297 Md.
at 15, 464 A.2d at 981.
90. Id.
91. Brief for Appellee at 8-10, Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 464 A.2d 977 (1983), states the
following account:
After Lawson had testified on direct examination this exchange occurred:
THE COURT Mr. Brown (Defense Counsel), would this be an appropriate time for
me to review Court's Exhibit No. 2 [Lawson's grand jury testimony]?
(DEFENSE COUNSEL): I would think so, Your Honor.
THE COURT. All right. Gentlemen, you'll just have to bear with me for a second.
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Most important, however, a judge's role within the judicial system
becomes distorted when he is required to view the grand jury testimony
through the spectacles of defense counselor to ascertain material that
would be useful to the defendant. This is an inappropriate role for a
judge to assume in our adversary system,92 because a judge is supposed
to act as a neutral arbitrator. He must decide if certain evidence is admissible after hearing arguments from both the defense and the prosecution and rule only upon the evidence presented before his court. A
judge is not in a position to determine the importance of portions of
testimony to the defendant's case. A judge is an ineffective substitute for
defendant's counsel,9 3 because he is not privy to counsel's strategy or to
confidential attorney-client conversations.94 A judge may miss the significance of an apparently innocent remark which would not escape the
detection of counsel who is more attuned to the facts of the case. 95
Thus, even a diligent and resourceful trial judge may be unable to ascertain what portions of a grand jury transcript a defense counselor could
use to his client's advantage on cross-examination.
The court's decision in Jones also is consistent with the modern
trend toward more open discovery in criminal trials. The purpose of
open discovery is to give both the prosecution and the defense access to

I'll see if I can do it at the Bench. If I can't, I'll take a brief recess. Just bear with
me please.
(Whereupon, there was a short recess taken.) (After the recess, the following proceedings were had in the presence and hearing of the Jury:)
THE COURT Mr. Brown, I'm going to ask you to begin your cross-examination at
this time. I'll take the matter up later ...
Lawson was then extensively cross-examined . . . . The court called a brief recess
after Lawson had testified and again reviewed in camera Lawson's grand jury testimony. After the recess the court gave defense counsel transcript excerpts of Lawson's grand jury testimony (six complete pages and parts of six other pages) but
otherwise denied the motion. The court then gave defense counsel the luncheon
recess to review the excerpts [which were subsequently not used in further crossexamination].
92. See 384 U.S. at 875 ("it is enough for judges to judge"), quotedn 297 Md. at 16, 464
A.2d at 981.
93. Leonard v. State, 46 Md. App. 631, 638-39, 421 A.2d 85, 89 (1980), af'd,290 Md. 295,
429 A.2d 538 (1981).
94. Compare id. ("These more subtle aspects of potential inconsistency, intrinsically subjective, have to be viewed from the defendant's perspective, and can be properly weighed only
by defense counsel (with the assistance of his client). A screening of the statement by the
court cannot suffice as an effective substitute. . . . [Ilt is incumbent upon the court . . . to

permit counsel to inspect the statement and determine for himself whether it is or is not
usable for cross-examination."), with Silbert v. State, 12 Md. App. 516, 525-26, 280 A.2d 55,
61, cert. denied, 263 Md. 720 (1971) (in camera review of grand jury minutes "adequately
protected" rights of defendant although "we recognize that in some cases in camera review of
grand jury minutes will not suffice to protect the accused's rights").
95. See 394 U.S. at 182.
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evidence that is relevant and may be used at trial.9 6 Some commentators have even argued that a defendant should have access to the grand
jury testimony of witnesses during the pre-trial discovery stage.97 But a
court need not go that far in order to further the goal of informed advocacy. Lawyers who have access to information that is in the possession
of the other side will be better equipped to assume their role as zealous
advocates. Advocates with equal access to all the facts are especially
important in American criminal trials, because the adversary trial is
considered the best means for finding out the truth concerning a defendant's guilt or innocence. The court did not mention this as a reason to
support its result in Jones, but the court's action may be justified on the
ground that it contributes to open discovery in criminal trials.
The court's action is especially compatible with Maryland law because Maryland procedures reflect a policy aimed at allowing broad discovery in criminal cases.98 For example, upon the request of the
defendant, the state must produce the name and address of each state
witness, copies of all statements made by the defendant or codefendants
to a state agent that the state intends to use, all reports or statements
from any expert who was consulted, and any books, papers, documents,
recordings, or photographs that the state intends to use at trial.99 Under
Brady v. Maiyland,'00 the state is constitutionally required to furnish the
defendant with any information that tends to negate his guilt or that
may reduce his punishment.'0 1 The state also must disclose evidence
acquired from any searches, or wiretaps, or pre-trial indentification procedures.1 0 2 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held in Carr v.
State'0 3 that due process requires that a defendant be furnished with the
statements of a state witness made to the police if the statements are
inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony. 0 4 The defendant, on the
other hand, must submit the names and addresses of alibi witnesses if
96. "Moreover, full discovery of grand jury minutes provides the basis for legal challenges
to the sufficiency, weight, competency and admissibility of the evidence presented." Grand
Juo, Reform: Hearings on HR. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citzhenshtp, and International
Law of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977) (statements of William
F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Robert J. DelTufo, Ass't Attorney General
of New Jersey and Director of Division of Criminal Justice), quoted in Arenella, supra note 31,
at 24 n.72.
97. See, e.g., Knudsen, supra note 20.
98. See MD. R.P. 4-263; see also Carr v. State, 284 Md. 455, 471, 397 A.2d 606, 614 (1979)
(rule is more liberal than the one it replaced in 1977).
99. MD. R.P. 4-263(b).
100. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
101. Id. at 87; see also MD. R.P. 4-263(a)(1).
102. MD. R.P. 741(a)(2).
103. 284 Md. 455, 397 A.2d 606 (1979).
104. Id. at 473, 397 A.2d at 615.
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requested by the state," °5 and if the defendant fails to disclose these
names, the court may refuse to allow the undisclosed alibi witness to
testify.t°6 The prosecutor may demand that the defendant appear in a
lineup, be fingerprinted, or undergo a physical or mental examination. ' 7 If the prosecutor requests, the defendant must submit the reports of experts he plans to use at trial.'0 8 These rules indicate that the
prosecutor or defense counsel often is required to disclose evidence that
is within his exclusive possession so that opposing counsel will have an
opportunity to examine the evidence in its entirety. Allowing defense
counsel to obtain the grand jury transcript is in keeping with this trend
in Maryland law.
Disclosure of grand jury testimony also reduces the potential for
abuse that accompanies secrecy' 0 9 and helps to remove the image of the
grand jury as the prosecutor's exclusive tool and rubber stamp." 0 In
practice, the grand jury is an investigatory arm of the state,''' and the
defendant has no equivalent means of collecting information prior to
trial.'i2 The grand jury may compel witnesses to testify.'
The defendant, on the other hand, has no similar power of investigation; he cannot
compel witnesses to speak with him prior to trial. Disclosure, as required by Jones, at least helps to equalize the position of prosecutor and
defendant at trial by giving them access to the same facts.
D.

Problems

There remain several shortcomings in the court's findings. According to Jones, a trial judge may review the witness' grand jury testimony
and excise those matters that "do not relate" to the case." 4 But the
court did not develop a standard for determining what matters are unre105. MD. R.P. 4-263(d)(3).
106. See Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 2114 (1983)
(on facts of this case, no abuse of discretion to exclude alibi evidence when alibi witness'
identity not disclosed to state until last day of trial); MD. R.P. 7 4 1(g).
107. MD. R.P. 4-263(d)(1).
108. MD. R.P. 4-263(d)(2).

109. If secrecy were maintained, a witness could say "X" before the grand jury and "Z" at
trial. "And, unless the subsequent testimony ran counter to that which the prosecution
wished to establish, there would be no way for the defendant to submit the contradiction to
the jury." Calkins, supra note 30, at 22.
110. See Sherry, supra note 74, at 682 ("An important by-product of this kind of grand jury
functioning is the fact that it strongly tends to demand standards of performance on the part
of both jury and prosecutor that empties the old accusation of district attorney's 'rubber
stamp' of any real meaning.').
111.Gerstein & Robinson, supra note 87, at 338.
112. See Arenella, supra note 31, at 9.
113. Id.
114. 297 Md. at 17, 464 A.2d at 982.
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lated. Because it is not clear what constitutes "matters that do not relate
to the case,""' 5 the court may have created a loophole by which a defendant will be denied his recently acknowledged right to grand jury
testimony for cross-examination purposes. If a judge may excise matters
not related to the facts of the case, then "unrelated" testimony may be
excised even if it tends to impeach a witness. If a judge may excise matters not related to the subject matter of the witness' trial testimony, then
there is potential for abuse because the prosecutor may, by carefully
limiting the direct examination, secure the excision of relevant
materials.
These problems would be resolved if a defendant were allowed to
obtain the transcript in its entirety. The defendant's right to review the
grand jury testimony of a witness who has testified for the state is based
upon his need for effective cross-examination. Thus, the defendant
should have access to those materials that will best fulfill that need." l6
Matters which superficially "do not relate" may still contribute to effective cross-examination." 7 A witness' credibility may be impeached by
demonstrating his bias, dishonesty, defects in his powers of observation
and recall; yet these matters may "not relate" to the facts of the particular case or to matters about which a witness has testified on direct examination. 1 8 If the trial judge is allowed to excise unrelated testimony
without consulting with counsel, he is in fact determining what may be
useful to the defense." 9 Although the judge ultimately will decide
which portions of the grand jury testimony are relevant and therefore
admissible at trial, that process would occur after defense counsel had
examined the transcript and pled his case for relevancy.
Certain portions of the witness' testimony arguably should remain
secret, and the state should be free to seek a protective order upon a

115. The general rule allows cross-examination of a witness on matters and facts that are
likely to affect his credibility. Cross-examination is not permitted, however, on matters that
are immaterial or irrelevant to the issue being tried. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 178, 468 A.2d
319, 321 (1983).
116. In Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222 n.12, the Court said that "disclosure can be limited
strictly to those portions of a particular witness' testimony that bear upon some aspect of his
direct testimony at trial." Certainly a witness' credibility or lack thereof qualifies as "some
aspect." But f Pittsburgh Plate Class, 360 U.S. at 410 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[The trial
judge's] task should be completed when he has satisfied himself what part of the grand jury
testimony covers the subject matter of the witness' testimony on the trial, and when he has
given that part to the defense.").
117. Commonwealth v. Hamm, 474 Pa. 487, 500-01, 378 A.2d 1219, 1226 (1977).
118. Id; accordJ. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 33 (2d ed. 1972).
119. Cf Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957) (Court disapproved a practice of
producing government documents for in camera determination of relevancy without hearing
the defendant), cited in 297 Md. at 16, 464 A.2d at 981.
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showing of good cause. 2 ° If, for example, the state is conducting an
ongoing investigation which may lead to future indictments against
other defendants, then secrecy might be justified.1 2 ' Additionally, if disclosure might compromise national security, then a protective order
would be the appropriate measure. 22 Thus, if the state had an interest
in keeping some testimony secret that outweighed the individual defendant's interest in disclosure, the judge could withhold those portions of
the transcript that related to that interest.
Another shortcoming of the Jones decision is the court's failure to
require that grand jury testimony be recorded and transcribed.' 2 3 Re24
cording, after all, is necessary to secure a meaningful right of access.'
While relieving the trial judge of much of the burden of deciding

120. There seems little reason why the present Maryland rule regarding protective orders
in criminal discovery could not be adapted for this purpose. See MD. R.P. 4-263(i).
121. Traynor, supra note 33, at 249.
122. See Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 3, 49
U.S.L.W. 187, 187 (1980).
123. 297 Md. at 22, 464 A.2d at 984. The court said that such a mandate would be in
contravention of MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-503 (1980), which makes recording
discretionary on the part of the jury judge. Id. However, this argument fails to suffice. Section 2-503(a) addresses two discretionary powers: first, "[t]he jury judge . . . may appoint a
stenographer to take and transcribe the testimony given before the grand jury" and second,
such transcript shall be "for the exclusive use and benefit of the grand jury and the State's
attorney unless otherwise ordered by the court." Id. (emphasis added). In Jones, the Court of Appeals held that when a defendant has shown particularized need, he is entitled to the grand
jury testimony, thereby eliminating the exclusivity of its use and relieving the trial court of
some of its discretion. In the same manner, the Court of Appeals could have relieved the trial
court's use of discretion with regard to recording by guaranteeing all prospective defendants
that grand jury testimony will be recorded for their use should indictment follow and particularized need be established.
124. Note, GrandJuy Secrec.- Should Witnesses Have Access to Their GrandJury Testimony as a
Matter of Right?, 20 UCLA L. REv. 804, 812 (1973).
There is no uniformity among the states concerning recording of grand jury testimony. In some states, it is required. See, e.g., State v. Canady, 187 Conn. 281, 284, 445 A.2d
895, 898 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 938 (1970 & Supp. 1983). Other states follow the rule
that recording is permissible but not mandatory. See, e.g., State v. Rich, 395 A.2d 1123, 1127
(Me. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 854 (1979); State v. Kaseman, 273 N.W.2d 716, 725 (S.D.
1978). At least one jurisdiction has found no authority sanctioning transcription. See State v.
Purrington, 112 N.H. 458, 462, 446 A.2d 451, 453 (1982).
Since 1979, all federal grand jury proceedings must be recorded. "All proceedings
except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by
an electronic recording device." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(l).
Prior to the rule's amendment in 1979, every federal circuit had said that recording
was permissive rather than mandatory. See, e.g., United States v. Alvisio, 440 F.2d 705, 708
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971). Nonetheless, the weakness of the old rule was
addressed by courts, see, e.g., United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 508 (9th Cir.), cert. deniedsub
nom. Light v. United States, 414 U.S. 846 (1973) ("the Government is courting disaster when
it fails to record grand jury proceedings"), and commentators, see, e.g., Knudsen, supra note
20, at 438 (lack of recordation has the greatest potential for abuse).
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whether a defendant can use grand jury testimony for cross-examination, the Court of Appeals effectively has shifted that burden to the jury
judge who, prior to trial or indictment and even prior to hearing any
grand jury testimony, must in effect decide whether a prospective defendant will ever be able to use this testimony for his own defense, although the defendant has not yet been indicted. 25 If it is improper for
a trial judge after he has reviewed the testimony to play the role of advocate and decide what will be useful to the defendant's case, it is also
improper for the jury judge to play the role of advocate and soothsayer
without the benefit of any testimony on which to base his decision.
12 6
Moreover, while the jury judge technically decides on recording,
in practice it is the prosecutor who initiates the request and thus effectively decides when to record, and it is the jury judge who routinely
consents. 12 7 The prosecutor may use recording to preserve testimony of
favorable witnesses who might not be available at trial or to record testimony of unfavorable witnesses and later use it to impeach the witness at
trial. If recording of grand jury proceedings is not mandatory, the prosecutor may be tempted to record only when it is to his advantage. Although the court in Jones said that the defendant could request that the
testimony be recorded, 12 1 this is an empty gesture because the defendant
usually does not know about the grand jury investigation.
III.

CONCLUSION

Despite its claims to the contrary, the Court of Appeals of Maryland created new law inJones v. State when it held that a defendant may
inspect a prosecution witness' grand jury testimony for cross-examination purposes after the witness has testified on direct examination without
showing that the testimony is needed for anything other than cross-examination. Although formally requiring a showing of particularized
need, the court allowed the defendant access as of right after the grand
jury witness has testified for the state at trial.
For the most part, the Maryland court reached the proper decision
but not as a result of the reasons it presented. The court incorrectly
relied on Supreme Court precedent which simply did not support the
125. The financial burden of recording may be of more immediate concern. Nonetheless,
the underlying assumption behind the federal rule requiring recording is that the cost is justified by improvement in the administration of criminal justice. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(3) advisory committee note.
126. See supra note 123.
127. Cf 297 Md. at 22, 464 A.2d at 984 ("whether to require transcription of recorded
grand jury testimony in a particular case is a matter for the discretion of the grand jury or the
State's Attorney and ultimately for the jury judge").
128. Id.
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Jones decision. Nonetheless, its holding can be vindicated by policy considerations, which were, however, not mentioned in the majority's opinion. The grand jury was originally clouded in secrecy to protect the
accused and to ensure the independence of this stage of the judicial process from governmental interference. Subsequently, other concerns such
as protection of witnesses, became additional justification for the secrecy
rules. More recently, the role of grand jury has become distorted into a
tool of the prosecution, and secrecy has become one more weapon in the
state's prosecutorial arsenal.Jones helps return the grand jury to its original role by allowing disclosure after a witness has testified and the reasons for secrecy are no longer applicable. This is consistent with the
movement in Maryland toward affording greater discovery-to criminal
defendants in general. Moreover, Jones is consistent with the trend toward allowing disclosure to the defendant as applied by the federal
courts under the Jencks Act as well as by a growing number of states.
The court furthered this progressive move by freeing judges from the
unwarranted role of pseudo-advocate, which had been forced upon
them in searching for inconsistencies in testimony as conditions precedent to disclosure.
Attention should now be directed toward alleviating conditions
that could frustrate these positive trends. Specifically, all grand jury
testimony should be recorded and subject to disclosure unless a need for
secrecy is demonstrated by the prosecutor acting within his proper role
in our adversarial system of justice.

WASHINGTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES v. CLARK- THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION IN A
PARENTAL RIGHTS
TERMINATION CASE
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Washington County Department
of Soctal Services v. Clark' found unconstitutional a rebuttable presumption contained in Article 16, section 76(c) of the Maryland Annotated
Code.2 The statute requires that, if a child has been in continuous foster
care for at least two years, the court must presume that the child's best
1. 296 Md. 190, 461 A.2d 1077 (1983).
2. The full text of § 76 is as follows:
§ 76. Decree of adoption or guardianship without consent of natural parent.
(a) In general.- A decree of adoption or guardianship may be granted without the consents of the natural parents required under §§ 72 and 73 of this article, if
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the natural
parents' rights is in the child's best interest, and that one or more of the following
circumstances or sets of circumstances exists:
(1) The child is alleged to have been abandoned and after a thorough investigation by the child placement agency, it is concluded that the identity of the parents is unknown and no one has claimed to be the parent of the child within 2
months of the alleged abandonment.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance, neglected,
abused, or dependent in a prior juvenile proceeding. In determining whether termination of natural parents' rights is in the child's best interest in this case, the court
shall consider the factors in subsection (b) of this section, and one of the following
continuing or serious conditions or acts of the parents:
(i) A disability which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the
immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended
periods of time;
(ii) Acts of abuse or neglect toward any child in the family; or
(iii) Repeated or continuous failure by the parents, although physically and
financially able, to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, and education, or other care and control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development. However, a parent legitimately practicing religious
beliefs who does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, is not for that
reason alone a negligent parent.
(3)(i) 1. The child has been continuously out of the custody of the parent
and in the custody of a child placement agency for at least 1 year;
2. The conditions which led to the separation still persist, or similar conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist;
3. There is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an
early date in order that the child can be returned to the parent in the immediate
future; and
4. The continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the
child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent family.
(ii) In determining whether termination of natural parents' rights is in the
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interests will be served by the termination of parental rights.3 The key
issue raised in the case is whether this presumption deprived the parents
of the due process of law guaranteed them by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
In order to make this determination, the court had to address and
answer two component questions: what was the effect of the presumption on the burden of proof, and was there a sufficiently rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed? Each of these
questions has constitutional implications; each may have provided a bachild's best interest in this case, the court shall further consider the factors in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Considerations in determining termination of naturalparenls'rights. In determining whether natural parents' rights should be terminated under subsection (a)(2) or
(a)(3) of this section, the court shall consider the following:
(1) The timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered or provided by the
child placement agency to facilitate reunion of the child with the parent;
(2) The terms of any social service agreement agreed to by the child placement agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their
obligations under the agreement;
(3) The child's feelings toward and emotional ties with the child's parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community; and
(5) The effort the parent has made to adjust the parent's circumstances,
conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best interest to be returned to the
parent's home, including:
(i) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular visitation or
other contact with the child as part of a plan to reunite the child with the parent,
although the court may not attach significant weight to incidental visitation, communications, or contributions;
(ii) The payment of a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and
maintenance if financially able to do so;
(iii) The maintenance of regular contact or communication with the legal
or other custodian of the child; and
(iv) Whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time, although the court may not consider whether the maintenance
of the parent-child relationship may serve as an inducement for the parent's rehabilitation.
(c) Presumption where child has been in agency custodyfor at least two years. (1) If a
child has been under continuous foster care in the custody of a child placement
agency for at least 2 years, the court shall presume that it is in the child's best
interest to award to that child placement agency a decree granting guardianship,
without the consent of the parents.
(2) In considering evidence to rebut this presumption the court shall consider all of the factors enumerated in subsection (b) of this section, with the exception of paragraph (5)(iv). (1982, ch. 514).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 76 (Supp. 1983). Article 16, § 76, has been recodified without
substantive change, effective October 1, 1984, and is now found at MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 5-313 (1984). The unconstitutional subsection (c) has been deleted by the General
Assembly as a result of the Clark decision.
3. Id. § 76(c).
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sis for the finding that the presumption was unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the court's unusually short opinion not only fails to demonstrate
a thorough analysis of the constitutional issue but also fails to articulate
the specific basis for the court's decision. This is particularly troubling
given the confusion surrounding the effect of presumptions in Maryland
law. Among all legal concepts, presumptions seem especially ambiguous.4 The term is used to mean many different things and, when used, is
often not defined.' Moreover, legal scholars and courts disagree on the
proper scope and effect of presumptions.
Because the Clark opinion does not demonstrate a thorough analysis
of the issue and does not specify the presumption's fatal flaw, it does
little to clarify Maryland law and is subject to misinterpretation or overbroad application. Therefore, this Recent Decision will examine the
current law with respect to presumptions of the type found in section
76(c) and analyze Clark in that light. Retracing the steps that the Court
of Appeals should have followed in reviewing section 76(c) uncovers the
probable basis for its decision: The connection between the basic fact
and the presumed fact in the section 76(c) presumption is not sufficiently "rational," and thus fails to meet the due process requirement of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.

I.

THE CLARK OPINION

Mary Alice Clark was the mother of five children. In 1980, she was
divorced from her husband and given custody of her children but soon
found herself unable to provide adequately for them. As a result, on the
order of the juvenile court in Washington County, the children were
declared to be in need of assistance, were removed from Mrs. Clark's

4. McCormick describes presumptions as "the slipperiest member of the family of legal
terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof.'"

C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF EVIDENCE § 342, at 802-03 (2d ed. 1972). See also Lansing, Enough is Enough. A Critiqueof
the Morgan View of Rebuttable Presumptionsin Civil Cases, 62 OR. L. REv. 485, 485 (1983) ("The
domain of presumptions has been called 'a place fraught with danger;' an 'impenetrable jungle;' a 'mist-laden morass-where more than one academician has been known to lose his way
.
' ") (quoting Burrier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 63 Wash. 2d 266, 274, 387 P.2d 58, 62
(1963)).
5. Judge Charles E. Moylan finds five very different meanings which have been applied
to the word "presumption," some of which he says are inappropriate. He comments that
[a]ll too frequently, no differentiation is made as to which of these five distinct
meanings is attached to the word "presumption" on a particular occasion. When
the same word or phrase means one thing to the writer or speaker and something
quite different to the reader or hearer, communicative chaos is inevitable.
Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 677, 349 A.2d 300, 325, aj'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629
(1975).
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home and were placed in foster care in February, 1980.6 Dissatisfied
with the lack of progress by Mrs. Clark in developing the capacity to
care for herself and her children, the County Department of Social Services petitioned in the Circuit Court of Washington County for guardianship of the five children with the right to consent to adoption or longterm foster care.7 The Department, in effect, sought to terminate Mrs.
Clark's parental rights over her objection."
The Chancellor considered whether Mrs. Clark's parental rights
should be terminated under either of two alternative legislative provisions. First, article 16, section 76(a), of the Maryland Annotated Code
empowers the court to grant a decree of adoption or guardianship without parental consent if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Mrs. Clark's rights is in the childrens' best interest and
that certain other specific circumstances exist.9 But the Chancellor determined that the Department had failed to meet the required clear and
convincing evidentiary standard in view of the evidence that Mrs. Clark
introduced. "
Second, the Department sought to terminate Mrs. Clark's rights
under a statutory rebuttable presumption which requires the court to
presume that it is in the childrens' best interests to award the Department guardianship if the children have been "under continuous foster
care in the custody of a child placement agency for at least 2 years."''
The statute enumerates the considerations to be weighed by the court in
determining whether this presumption has been rebutted.' 2 Although
the Chancellor determined that Mrs. Clark had not introduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption,'" he declared that the presumption created by section 76(c) unconstitutionally infringed on Mrs.
6. ExparteWashington County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 1986 Adoption Docket, mem.
op. at I (Cir. Ct. Washington County Sept. 8, 1982).
7. Id.
8. There is no indication in the record that Mr. Clark objected to the petition.
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 76(a) (Supp. 1983).
10. Expare Washington County Dep't of Social Servs., mem. op. at 12. The Chancellor
cited the recent Supreme Court case of Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), for the clear
and convincing requirement. Mer. op. at 3, 6.
11. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 76(c)(1) (Supp. 1983).
12. Id.§ 76(c)(2).
13. Exparte Washington County Dep't of Social Servs., mem.op. at 6. The Chancellor's
finding that Mrs. Clark had failed to rebut the presumption is inconsistent with his finding
that, because of her contrary testimony, the state had failed to prove its case by clear and
convincing evidence when itwas proceeding under § 76(a)(2) and § 76(a)(3), the alternative
grounds for terminating parental rights to § 76(c). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
The factors the court uses in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted are
essentially the same factors used in determining whether parental rights should be terminated
under § 76(a)(2) or (a)(3). Therefore, if Mrs. Clark submitted evidence that prevented the
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Clark's procedural due process rights because it failed to meet the clear
and convincing standard of proof.'4 The Department of Social Services
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari before consideration by the intermediate court. The
Court of Appeals stated that the legislature may not satisfy "the due
process rights of Mrs. Clark by providing by presumption the clear and
convincing proof needed to warrant termination of her parental rights
to raise her children"' 5 and affirmed the Chancellor's conclusion that
section 76(c) is unconstitutional.' 6 The Court of Appeals noted that the
right of parents to raise their children is a fundamental right protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the
state must present clear and convincing evidence that the childrens' best
interests will be otherwise served before it may limit or terminate that
right. 17 The court then declared that presumptions cannot be used to
circumvent constitutional principles.' 8 Finally, it concluded that the
presumption in section 76(c) did not meet this clear and convincing evidentiary standard and consequently violated the mother's right to pro9
cedural due process.'
II.

IDENTIFYING THE PRESUMPTION

The many senses in which the term "presumption" is used can be
reduced to three basic categories: 1) irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions, in which the presumed fact must be accepted by the factfinder
and cannot be controverted by the party against whom it operates;
2) rational or permissive inferences, in which the presumed fact follows
state from satisfying its burden of proof under § 76(a)(2) or (a)(3), it is not clear how the
Chancellor could have found that she failed to rebut the presumption with the same evidence.

14. Exparte Washington County Dep't of Social Servs., mem. op. at 6.
15. Clark, 296 Md. at 196, 461 A.2d at 1080.
16. Id. at 197, 461 A.2d at 1081.
17. Id. at 196, 461 A.2d at 1080. The Court of Appeals, like the circuit court, cites
Santosky for these principles.
18. Id.at 197, 461 A.2d at 1080. The court cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964), and Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911). However, the
applicability of these cases to the issues in Clark is minimal. Both New York Tnes Co. and
Bail , involved conclusive presumptions that precluded any opportunity to rebut. The presumption in Clark is rebuttable, a key saving feature where, as here, the attack is based on due
process grounds.
Furthermore, Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944), significantly qualifies Bailey. In
Pollock the Court struck down a presumption similar to that which it had invalidated in Balley, saying that both presumptions were unconstitutional, not so much because they violated
due process, but because their effect was to directly and deliberately contravene the antipeonage provisions of the thirteenth amendment. Were it not for this effect, the court im-

plied, the presumptions might well have passed due process muster. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 2223.
19. Clark, 296 Md. at 197, 461 A.2d at 1081.
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from the basic fact by ordinary reasoning processes without any assistance from statutes or judicial decisions and which the factfinder may
accept or reject; and 3) the rebuttable presumption, in which the presumed fact, more or less logically related to the basic fact, must by law
be taken by the factfinder as proved unless rebutted by the introduction
of contradictory evidence. There seems to be a basic consensus that the
third type, the rebuttable presumption, is the only true presumption.2 °
Examination of the language and characteristics of section 76(c)
indicates that what is created is a true presumption. First, the factfinder
is required to accept the presumed fact that the child's best interests will
be served by the termination of parental rights when the state has established the basic fact that the child has been under continuous foster care
for at least two years.2" Second, the factfinder is not permitted to make
of the proved fact anything other than the presumed fact that is stated
in the statute. Third, the presumption is rebuttable. 22 The statute even
lists the factors the court is to consider in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted.23
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMPTIONS

The power of a legislature to create statutory presumptions is wellsettled. One of the earliest cases upholding this power is Mobile, Jackson
& Kansas City Railroad v. Turz'seed.24 There the Supreme Court said
"[ljegislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute primafacie
evidence of the main fact in issue is but to enact a rule of evidence, and
quite within the general power of government. ' 25 Although this power
of the legislature is uncontroverted, the constitutionality of presumptions has been found to depend on the procedural effects of the presumption and the closeness of the link between the fact proved and the
fact presumed.
A.

The ProceduralEffect of the Presumption

While some scholars disagree about the procedural effect presump20. See C. MCCoRMICK, supra note 4, § 342; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of
Law Upon the Burden of Proof 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920); Keeton, Statutoty PresumptonsTheir Constitutionalityand Legal Effect, 10 TEX. L. REV. 34 (1931-32); Morgan, FurtherObservations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245 (1943). For a discussion of true presumptions by a
Maryland court, see Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640 passim, 349 A.2d 300 passim.
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 76(c)(1).
22. Id.§ 76(c)(2).
23. Id.§ 76(b).
24. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
25. Id at 42.
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tions ought to have in certain situations,2 6 the constitutional limits to the
effect seem to be set. The Supreme Court has stated that it is constitutional in a routine civil case for a presumption to shift the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumed fact. 27 The Court also has
permitted presumptions to shift the burden of persuasion in civil cases as
long as no fundamental liberty of the type protected by the fourteenth
amendment due process clause is threatened.28 It has been said that
such a shift of the burden of persuasion is especially apt when presumptions have been established by deliberate legislative choice to promote
certain social policies.29 By shifting the burden of persuasion in such
cases the legislative goals are furthered whenever the evidence is in
equipoise.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not permitted presumptions to shift the burden of persuasion when the presumption infringes
on a constitutionally protected fundamental liberty interest, whether the
matter is criminal or civil in nature. Due process requires that the party
threatening such liberty interests bear the burden of persuasion as to
each element of his claim. For example, in Speiser v. Randall,3" the
Supreme Court invalidated a California statutory presumption that
placed on the taxpayer the burden of persuading the state that he had
26. For a variety of views on the effects to be given rebuttable presumptions, see C. McCORMICK, supra note 4, § 345, at 819-29; Bohlen, supra note 20; Brosman, The Statutoy
Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REv. 17 (1930); Hale, Evidence-Constitutional Law-Necessity of Logical
Inference to Support a Presumption, 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1943); Keeton, supra note 20; Morgan,
supra note 20; Note, Constitutionah'ty of Rebuttable Statutoy Presumptions, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527
(1955); Recent Developments, Evidence-1932, 46 HARV. L. REv. 1138 (1933).
27. In reference to a presumption under due process attack, the Supreme Court in Turmnpseedstated that the "statutory effect of the rule is to provide that evidence of an injury arising
from the actual operation of trains shall create an inference of negligence . . . . The only
legal effect of this inference is to cast upon the railroad company the duty of producing some
evidence to the contrary." Turmpseed, 219 U.S. at 43.
Presumptions commonly shift the burden of production in civil cases, Breeden v.
Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (4th Cir. 1974), and this procedural result is normally
viewed as the minimum effect of presumptions in civil cases. C. MCCORMICK supra note 4,
§ 342, at 803; Hale, supra note 26, at 49-50. Ordinarily, when a presumption operates merely
to shift the burden of production, no constitutional due process problems should arise. As
Brosman points out,
considered as a rule of evidence the effect of which is to transfer to the party against
whom the presumption operates at least some burden, legal or otherwise, of producing evidence. . . the statutory presumption in the usual case should not be deemed
to deprive of due process, and the overwhelming majority of cases have so held.
Brosman, supra note 26, at 179.
28. See, e.g., Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976), in which the Supreme Court stated
that "[o]utside the criminal law area, where special concerns attend, the locus of the burden
of persuasion is normally not an issue of federal constitutional moment." Id. at 585.
29. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 345, at 827-28.
30. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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not engaged in criminal speech.3 1 The Court held that the presumption
insufficiently protected the taxpayer's first amendment rights and thus
violated due process. The Supreme Court declared that "the more important the rights at stake the more important must be the procedural
safeguards surrounding those rights"3 2 and that "[w]here the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires in
circumstances of this case that the State bear the burden of persuasion
')33

Constitutionally, then, civil presumptions always may shift the burden of production, and, if no fundamental right is threatened, the burden of persuasion also may be shifted. However, if a civil presumption
impinges upon a fundamental right, it may not shift the burden of
persuasion.34
Although the express language of section 76(c) does not clearly indicate what effect the legislature intended the presumption to have on
the allocation of the burden of proof, the legislative history of the statute
does. The immediate predecessor of section 76-former section 75created an almost identical presumption.3' But despite the similiarity,
former section 75 differed in one significant respect. It required "substantial proof" of certain specified facts before the presumption of best
interests could be rebutted.3 6 Even without Maryland case law interpreting this "substantial proof' requirement, the statutory language ar-

31. Id. at 528-29.
32. Id. at 520-21.
33. Id. at 526. But see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 345, at 817-18:
In civil cases there is no reason. . . to limit the effect that a presumption may have
on the burdens of proof. . . . The burdens of proof are fixed at the pleading stage,
not for constitutional reasons, but for reasons of probability, social policy and convenience. There is no reason why the same policy considerations, as reflected in the
operation of a presumption, should not be permitted further to effect an allocation
of the burdens of proof during the course of the trial (footnotes omitted).
Criminal presumptions are construed even more narrowly than civil presumptions
that threaten fundamental rights. Criminal presumptions may shift neither the burden of
persuasion nor the burden of production. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 346, at 831. The
Supreme Court views criminal presumptions as "troublesome procedural device[s]," Ulster
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979), and has treated them as permissive inferences rather than as mandatory presumptions, id. at 158 n.16; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4,
§ 346, at 831; Brosman, supra note 26, at 197-98.
34. For Maryland decisions applying these limits, see Keeney v. Prince George's County
Dep't of Social Servs., 43 Md. App. 688, 695, 406 A.2d 955, 960 (1979), cert. denied, 286 Md.
748 (1980); Plummer v. Waskey, 34 Md. App. 470, 485, 368 A.2d 478, 486-87, cert. denied, 280
Md. 734 (1977); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 706-30, 349 A.2d 300, 341-54 (1975).
35. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 75(a) (1981) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 76(c) (Supp. 1983)).

36. Id. § 75(c).
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guably indicates a legislative intent to shift to the defendant not just the
burden of production, but also the burden of persuasion.
In Hicks v. Prince George's County Department of Social Seri'ces,3 7 the
Court of Appeals determined that the presumption in former section 75
did shift the burden of persuasion to the parents to establish their fitness. 8 It declared that the Chancellor erred when he found that "any
evidence tending to show that there was not an abandonment or voluntary relinquishment of a child is sufficient to overcome the presumpThe Court of Appeals found significance in the words
tion. '""
"substantial proof,"4 and remanded the case so that the evidence submitted in rebuttal by the parent could be weighed against that
standard.
Given the language differences between former section 75 and present section 76(c) and the judicial interpretation of the "substantial
proof" requirement of former section 75, the removal of this requirement by the legislature when it enacted present section 76 indicates an
intent to ease the rebuttal burden of parents by not shifting to them the
burden of persuasion. Thus, section 76(c) should be read to shift only
the burden of production. 4 ' As has been seen, such a shift does not violate due process and provides no basis for finding section 76(c)
unconstitutional.
B.

The Rational Connection

In Turni'pseed, the Supreme Court articulated the rational connection test which determines in part whether a statutory presumption violates the due process clause.4 2 The Court declared that if a presumption
of one fact from proof of another is not to violate due process, "it is only
essential that there be some rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary

37. 281 Md. 93, 375 A.2d 558 (1977).
38. Id.at 102, 375 A.2d at 563. Three years later, the Court of Special Appeals repeated
that the presumption in former § 75 shifted the burden of persuasion to the parent to show his
fitness. Keeney v. Prince George's County Dep't of Social Servs., 43 Md. App. 688, 695, 406
A.2d 955, 959 (1979).
39. Hicks, 281 Md. at 102, 375 A.2d at 563 (emphasis added) (citing the circuit court

opinion).
40. Id.at 103, 375 A.2d at 563.
41. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-6, id.
42. It has been suggested that the "rational connection" test would be better termed the
"inferential connection" test, since "[w]hat it requires is not a 'rational' connection, but
rather an 'inferential' connection; the basic facts proven must have some tendency to establish

the fact presumed."

Note, supra note 26, at 537.
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mandate."4 3
The rational connection test, although it is the single most critical
test of the constitutionality of presumptions, has been criticized for raising as many questions as it answers.4 4 The degree to which the fact
proved must logically arise from the fact presumed before the connection will be found to be rational is not immediately clear. Also, the test
at first glance suggests that a uniform standard is applicable to all presumptions. Tumipseed's "purely arbitrary" standard infers that the test
will be met even if the presumed fact does not more likely than not flow
from the proved fact alone. Presumptions in civil and criminal cases
have been found constitutional even when there was only a "tenuous
logical connection" between the fact proved and the fact presumed45
and even when the fact proved could not support a verdict in the absence of the presumption.46 Courts have held that "the requirement of a
rational connection . . . mean[s] no more than that the basic fact must
be relevant to the presumed fact, however slightly it raises its
probability."4 7
Rationality in the sense of mere relevance created serious constitutional difficulties when used as the standard to test criminal presumptions because it permitted the state to do by presumption what it was
not permitted to do directly. By simply proving a basic fact beyond a
reasonable doubt, even if the fact were merely relevant to the presumed
fact and relatively meaningless by itself, the state was in effect able to
establish elements of crimes by less than a preponderance of the evi-

43. Turmzpseed, 219 U.S. at 43. Many writers have suggested that the rational connection
test is not applicable to civil presumptions, that only criminal presumptions need pass it. Eg.,
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 344, at 817-18:
In civil cases there is no reason . . . to limit the creation of presumptions to instances in which there is a rational connection between the proved fact and the
presumed fact.

. . .To impose a "rational connection" limitation upon the creation or operation of
presumptions in civil cases would mean that only presumptions based on
probability would be permissible. Such a limitation would ignore other, equally
valid, reasons for the creation of the rules.
However, the Supreme Court often applies the test to civil presumptions, most recently in
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 28 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Comment, The CaliforniaEvidence Code: Presumptions,53 CALIF. L. REV. 1439,
1468 (1965); Note, supra note 26, at 537-38.
45. Comment, supra note 44, at 1468.
46. Id.at n.145.
47. Note, supra note 26, at 537. The Note lists several state cases decided before and after
Turn'pseed which have essentially equated "rational" with "relevant." Id.at n.63.
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dence.48 In other words, the state, statutorily authorized to presume elements of a crime it could not otherwise prove, was allowed to use
evidence which would not even support a civil judgment to establish an
element of a crime "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Consequently, in order to protect due process rights, the Supreme
Court has come to require more of the rational connection in criminal
presumptions than mere relevance. In Ulster County Court v. Allen49 the
Court declared that, "since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption unless the
fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a rea50
sonable doubt."
Allen and Turnipseed together establish the two extremes of the rational connection continuum. First, in a criminal case in which a fundamental liberty interest is threatened and the standard of proof is
"beyond a reasonable doubt", the connection in a presumption operating to establish an element of the crime must likewise be beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, in a civil case in which no fundamental right is
threatened and in which the standard of proof is "more likely than not,"
the connection in a presumption operating to establish liability need
only be rational in the sense of not purely arbitrary. It is clear from
Allen and Turn'pseed that, as the standard of proof increases and as the
right threatened becomes more fundamental, the connection between
the basic and presumed facts must become closer. It is also clear that,
for purposes of determining the constitutionality of presumptions, the
key is not whether they are civil or criminal, but rather what rights are
threatened and what standard of proof is applicable. 5 1
Between the two extremes of Allen and Turnipseedlies Clark -a civil
48. See generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutoty Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 341 (1970).

49. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
50. Id. at 167. In Allen the Court distinguishes mandatory presumptions, in which the
connection must be beyond a reasonable doubt, and what it calls "permissive presumptions"
or permissive inferences, in which the connection need only be more likely than not. The
latter cannot prove an element of a crime without other evidence. See id.at 157-60. As to
mandatory criminal presumptions, some have concluded there can be no such thing. See, e.g.,
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 346, at 831; Note, supra note 48, at 343.
51. The Court also considers whether the presumption under analysis is a true presumption with a mandatory effect on the factfinder or merely a permissive inference. Speaking of
the criminal permissive inferences then under review in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969), the Supreme Court said that "a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend." Id.at 36. See also Alen, 442 U.S. at 166-67. The Supreme Court
requires presumptions to have a tighter rational connection than permissive inferences, given
a particular standard of proof. Id.
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matter, but one in which a fundamental liberty interest is threatened
and in which the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.
The precise connection required of a presumption like section 76(c) operating in this kind of a case has not been directly decided nor discussed.
Nevertheless, due process demands that the connection between the fact
proved and the fact presumed in section 76(c) be clear and convincing.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Santosky v. Kramer52 in which the
"clear and convincing" standard of proof was mandated in parental
rights termination cases strongly supports the proposition that, like the
standard of proof, the connection in section 76(c) must be clear and
convincing. Although Santosky did not address the constitutionality of a
presumption, the reasoning used by the Court to derive the standard of
proof should be applied to a determination of the degree of rationality
required of the presumption in section 76(c). The clear and convincing
standard is thus applicable because the Maryland statute seeks the same
ends as the New York statute which was struck down in Santosk.
Santosky established that due process requires a clear and convincing
quality of evidence when that evidence is used to terminate over their
objections the rights of parents to raise their children. If the fact of two
years of continuous foster care by itself is to warrant a directed verdict
for the state, that fact must be clear and convincing evidence that the
childrens' best interests will be served by the termination of their parents' rights. It must lead to the presumed fact with the same certainty as
the standard of proof demands. To permit the state to terminate Mrs.
Clark's parental rights solely on the basis of a presumption that establishes the crucial fact with less certainty than the standard of proof requires is to blatantly circumvent Santosk. Herein lies the probable basis
for the Court of Appeals' finding that section 76(c) was unconstitutional.
Just as the state is prohibited from establishing an element of a crime by
relying on a presumption that contains a reasonably doubtful connection, so too the state is prohibited from relying on a presumption which
contains a less than clear and convincing connection in an action to
terminate parental rights.
Two counter-arguments support the proposition that the connection in section 76(c) can and ought to be less than clear and convincing
while still meeting the requirements of due process. First, courts have
long approved presumptions in ordinary civil cases in which the standard of proof is "more likely than not" even though the connections are

52. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (the Court struck a New York statute permitting termination of
parental rights over their objection upon a finding of permanent neglect by a preponderance
of the evidence).
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less than that, i.e., merely relevant.5 3 Thus, the standard of proof and
the connection required in a presumption are not always identical in
civil cases. Judicial approval of this merely rational or relevant connection in ordinary civil presumptions arises from deference to legislative
judgments about the nature of things in matters of slight concern to
society.5 4 However, in matters involving fundamental rights the courts
are clearly less inclined to yield to legislative judgments. 55 Consequently, when a presumption like section 76(c) threatens parents' rights
to raise their children, it is proper for the courts to scrutinize the legislature's assessment of the connection and make certain for itself that it is
not just reasonable or plausible, but also clear and convincing.
Second, it might also be argued that the state interests in a stable
family environment and in the mental well-being of a child 56 warrant a
lesser connection in the presumption than would otherwise be required. 57 The response to that argument is that the Supreme Court,
when it mandated the clear and convincing standard of proof in parental rights termination cases in Santosky, dzdconsider the state's interestsinterests essentially the same as those prompting section 76(c) 5 -- but
discounted them.5 9 To give those interests special effect by reducing the
connection required between the fact proved and the fact presumed in
section 76(c) is to give them an effect Santosky would not permit.
In summary, if the presumption in section 76(c) is to pass the rational connection test, the fact of two years of continuous foster care
must establish that the best interests of the Clark children are served by
the termination of Mrs. Clark's parental rights to the same degree as
required by the standard of proof-by clear and convincing evidence.

53. See supra note 47.
54. The Court has shown great deference to classification schemes in social and economic
legislation, upholding classifications against equal protection attack "if the classification has
some 'reasonable basis,'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), or when "there
are plausible reasons for [the legislature's] action," United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). This principle of deference in equal protection matters is
applicable to the rational connection issue.
55. See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Continuing the equal protection
analogy, when a classification creates a suspect class or infringes on a fundamental right,
judicial scrutiny of the legislation becomes strict and the burden of showing that the legislation is necessary to promote a compelling state interest is shifted to the state. See also Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
56. See, e.g., Keeney v. Prince George's County Dep't of Social Servs., 43 Md. App. 688,
697-98, 406 A.2d 955, 960-61 (1979), cert. denied, 286 Md. 748 (1980).
57. See Comment, supra note 44, at 1469.
58. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 ("the State's goal is to provide the child with a permanent
home").
59. Id at 767.
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Only if the basic fact clearly and convincingly establishes the presumed
fact will section 76(c) stand the test.
There is no clear indication in the Court of Appeals' Clark opinion
or in the circuit court's memorandum opinion that either court applied
the rational connection test to section 76(c) or, if it did, whether the
connection was required to be clear and convincing. However, applying
that test now, it cannot be said that simply establishing that the Clark
children had been in continuous foster care in the custody of a child
placement agency for at least two years was clear and convincing proof
that the childrens' best interests would be furthered by terminating Mrs.
Clark's parental rights. The extensive information that the state must
introduce to prove clearly and convincingly that parental rights should
be terminated in the absence of the presumption' indicates that the
time the children have spent in foster care is only relevant to the question of whether their best interests are served by terminating their parents' rights. That her children spent two years in foster care says little
regarding Mrs. Clark's present or future fitness as a parent. Surely it
would be reasonable for a factfinder to conclude that the simple fact of
two years of foster care is not clear and convincing evidence that the
childrens' best interests would be served by terminating Mrs. Clark's
parental rights, notwithstanding the legislature's judgment. To be sure,
there is authority for judicial deference to the legislature's assessment of
the sufficiency of the connection in a permissive inference.6 1 Judicial
scrutiny must intensify and deference to the legislature will be inappropriate, however, when the presumption has a mandatory effect on the
factfinder and infringes on fundamental liberty interests, as section 76(c)
does.

62

In Keeney v. Prince George's County Department of Social Services,63 the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals did uphold the predecessor of sec-

60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 76(a) (Supp. 1983).
61. The Supreme Court has on at least two separate occasions indicated it will defer to
legislative judgments regarding the sufficiency of the connection in a presumption. In United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), the Court said "[t]he process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in matters not within specialized
judicial competence or completely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the
capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it." Id
at 67.
In Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Supreme Court declared that "in the
judicial assessment [of the sufficiency of the rational connection] the congressional determination favoring the particular presumption must, of course, weigh heavily." Id. at 36. See also
Morgan, Tot v. United States: ConstitutionalRestrictions on Statutoy Presumptions, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 1324, 1325 (1943).
62. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
63. 43 Md. App. 688, 406 A.2d 955 (1979), cert. denied, 286 Md. 748 (1980).
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tion 76(c)-former section 75-which was similar in many respects to
section 76(c). The court found that the presumption in former section
76 met the rational connection test of Turnipsed.64 But Keeney cannot
serve as valid precedent for a finding that section 76(c) passes the rational connection test. Former section 75 was enacted and Keeney was
decided before Santosky established the clear and convincing standard.
Former section 75 contains no indication that the presumption was created consistent with the clear and convincing standard. Neither does
the Keeney opinion demonstrate that former section 75 was held to that
standard. Therefore, Keeney is of little utility in a review of section 76(c).
The rational connection test provides a strong basis for the finding
by the Court of Appeals that section 76(c) is unconstitutional. The connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed is not strong
enough to meet the required clear and convincing standard.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the two constitutional tests are applied to section 76(c), the action
of the Court of Appeals in invalidating the statute can be understood.
The deficiency of the opinion is not its conclusion. Rather the deficiency-and it is a serious one-is the court's failure to demonstrate a
thorough and deliberate analysis of the constitutionality of the statute.
The court left the reader to speculate as to the nature and extent of its
analysis, particularly regarding the rational connection test as applied to
section 76(c). Consequently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland missed
the chance to clarify and develop a complicated and confusing body of
law. Had it taken advantage of that opportunity, the court might have
offered the General Assembly some guidance on how to deal in a constitutional manner with the problem of children in long-term foster care.

64. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that

[Riecognized psychological authorities have found a definite correlation between a
stable environment and the mental well-being of the child. In Goldstein, Freed and
Salnit, Beond the Best Interest of the Child (1973) the authors emphasize the child's
need for continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence in
order to maximize his normal development . . . . The court believes that the substantial psychological data supporting the theory that proper psychological development requires continuity in the child's external environment provides a rational
basis for section 75 . . [and] that there is a valid rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.
Id. at 696-97, 406 A.2d at 960-61 (citing the circuit court's opinion).

